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ABSTRACT
IMPARTIALITY, SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS AND COLLECTIVE
MEMORY: THREE ESSAYS ON TRUST IN POLICE
Matthew R. Fischer
July 17, 2019
This dissertation is an historical and empirical examination of police organizational
efforts at influencing public perceptions of trust in police. It begins with an historical
overview of police organizational reform, focusing on the various strategies employed by
police reformers have attempted to influence public perceptions of police trustworthiness
and legitimacy. It uses Rothstein’s impartiality as Quality of Government thesis and the
theory of collective memory to argue for an understanding of the importance of the
normative context in which police tactics and strategies are deployed for garnering trust in
police and how the presence of social network effects for trust in police complicate
contemporary efforts at changing perceptions. The latter part of the dissertation tests for
the existence of these effects empirically.
The dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter One gives an historical
overview of police efforts to influence trust in police and argues that reformers have
overlooked normativity and peer effects as factors influencing trust in police. Chapter Two
investigates whether, in addition to police performance and procedural fairness, universal
impartiality is a significant predictor of trust in police. Chapter Three tests for the presence
of a social network effect for trust in police. It argues that one interpretation of the
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consequences of the existence of a social network effect for trust in police is that it can lead
to path dependent outcomes similar to the effects of collective memory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The topic of trust in police is an important one. It seems that almost daily police
find themselves in situations where institutionally they take three steps forward and four
steps back. For every positive in-road police make earning the trust of the people they
serve, new problems (or persistent old ones) threaten to undo their efforts. Trust in police
in the United States has been back at its historical average of 52%, with African Americans
sitting at around 30%. If people do not trust the police it is unlikely that they will cooperate
with them, which is significant because the police need the cooperation of the public in
order to co-produce public safety with them. A gap in trust in police means that police are
less effective at controlling and deterring crime, which can affect how the public evaluate
police performance, which can lead to decreased public support for police, which makes
police less effective at their jobs. If enough people lose trust in the police, it may not be
possible to ever regain that lost trust. Clearly, the stakes for understanding trust in police
are high.
While real-world incidents threaten to undermine trust in police, the criminal justice
literature on trust in police highlights some gaps in scholarly understanding about the
factors which influence trust in police. The history of criminal justice thinking on the topic
of trust in police shows that it has only been recently that scholars have been working from
a reform aimed at improving perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy that has
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an empirical micro-foundation. However, this literature does not talk about how the
normative context in which police tactics designed to increase police trust, like the
procedural fairness perspective, influences individual- and social group-levels of trust in
police. Second, the extant literature only accounts for the impact of individual perceptions
on the decision to trust in police without considering that people tend to follow the attitudes
and behaviors of their social reference groups when making decisions. The current
dissertation attempts to address these two gaps in the existing literature.
This dissertation is comprised of three articles which are presented in Chapters 2,
3 and 4. The first article presents a review of literature organized around the topic of trust
in police. The review begins with the inception of the so-called professional era of policing
in the U.S., continuing through to the community policing era up to the present day and the
advent of the procedural fairness perspective. The strengths and weaknesses of each are
discussed, leading to the presentation of two critiques based on gaps within the literature.
The first critique is that trust-building tools, like community policing or procedural
fairness, must be grounded in a normative value in order to build the kind of broad-based
trust and legitimacy those perspectives seek. The value of universal (deontological)
impartiality provides a necessary context to the exercise of tools like procedural justice
which people use to evaluate their encounters with police. The second is that gaining trust
and legitimacy for police requires more than a shift police behavior during interpersonal
contacts because people are also influenced in their attitudes and behavior by their social
reference group. That people are influenced in their decision to trust police by the
prevalence of that modality in their social reference group means that programs which only
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address individual and interpersonal experiences between the police and the public may
lead to ill-informed decision-making regarding policies designed to engage the citizenry.
Based on the European Social Survey Round 5, article two develops the first
critique by examing empirically the concept of universal impartiality and its relevance as
a factor that influences trust in police. Using structural equation modeling, this article
demonstrates that, in addition to police performance and procedural fairness, universal
impartiality is a predictor of trust in police. It is argued that Tyler’s fairness and Rothstein’s
impartiality are not synonyms but represent two separate and distinct concepts, one of
which is based on subjective perceptions (fairness) and the other which is a universal and
an absolute (impartiality). The consequences discussed in the conclusion of the article are
the following: impartiality is not an objective truth discovered by this study, but are instead,
owing to the survey nature of the data set, what people expect from their police institutions.
Finally, the third article analyzes differences in individual levels of police trust
using the concept of social network effects. The basic idea is that a person’s decision to
trust the police is at least partially dependent on the trusting culture in the city in which
respondents live. Based on the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the F.B.I.’s Uniform
Crime Report and the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics data
sets, an instrumental variable probit regression model was built to model trust in police
mode choice as a function of personal, crime and city-specific variables, including network
effects. Two city-level instrumental variables are used, based on U.S. Census data for
median household income per capita and F.B.I. violent crime data, and found that a social
network effect exists and can be derived quantitatively which permits measuring effect
sizes. Since there is empirical evidence that trust in police decision-making depends on
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network effects, police scholars may wish to focus not only on the quality of interpersonal
contact but also the context in which those contacts are handled. A tie-in to universal
impartiality is proposed as a way to address the influence of the social network effect.
The dissertation finishes up with a brief conclusion, summarizing the results,
presenting the limitations and giving an outlook on further research in the area of police
trust, impartiality and social network effects.
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CHAPTER II
TRUST IN POLICE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND TWO EXPANSIONS
Introduction
In the recent past there have been a number of high profile killings of unarmed
African American males at the hands of police officers which has led to widespread protest
against police violence across the country (e.g., Eric Garner, Michael Brown), the deaths
of African Americans in police custody (e.g., Sandra Bland and Freddie Gray) and the
perceived failure of the criminal justice system to yield convictions in these and other
instances. The consequences of these high-profile events have been a decrease in trust and
confidence in the police. For example, a Gallup poll published in 2015 saw trust and
confidence among US residents tied with 1993 for the record low of 52% (Jones 2015).
Further, a Pew Research poll reporting on the changes in rates of trust and confidence in
the police by comparing 2015-2017 to 2012-2014 benchmarks found that that trust and
confidence in the police decreased among Hispanics (2012-2014: 59%; 2015-2017: 45%),
liberals (2012-2014: 51%; 2015-2017: 39%) and people under the age of 30 (2012-2014:
56%; 2015-2017: 44%) to below 50%. That same poll showed that for African Americans,
trust and confidence in the police remains low: trust decreased from 35% to 30% over that
same period (ibid.).
The scenario described above is not new for police in the United States. Going back
to the 1930s, police scholars and practitioners have sought ways of improving the image
of police in the eyes of the public in order to gain the public’s trust and support (Fogelson
5

1977; Moore and Kelling 1983). Over the years, police reformers proposed a number of
organizational strategies which sought by various means to increase public perceptions of
police trustworthiness and legitimacy. Those strategies are: the police performance model,
community policing and the procedural fairness perspective. The police performance
model was an implicit trust model in that up to that point in U.S. history the police had a
reputation for political meddling and corruption (ibid.). Early police reformers recast the
police in the mold of J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation which made
policing a professional career concerned only with the biggest crimes and the surest solves
(Kelling and Moore 1988). The subsequent community policing philosophy was a reaction
to the social and political isolation of police which occurred as a result of the professional
model (Greene 2000). The goal was to encourage the public to coproduce public safety
with the police and to build trust through these efforts (Rosenbaum 1988; Lurigio and
Rosenbaum 1986). Yet, the failure to explicitly theorize and empirically scrutinize on the
topic of police trust formation was a weakness of these early organizational attempts
(Moore and Kelling 1983; Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter and Bennett 2014). Although the
police performance model and the community policing philosophy 1 remain the
organizational paradigm in many departments (Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson 2001; Zhao,
He and Lovrich 2003), the procedural fairness perspective, which is the most recent effort
to build trust between police and the public, has received a great deal of scholarly attention
over the past 20 years. Following the President’s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing,
which advocated for legitimacy to be the goal of police reform in the United States (2015),
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There are more departments that use the police performance model than the community policing philosophy.
Trojanowicz, Kapeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux (1998), as well as Zhao, He and Lovrich (2003) point out that
many departments have adopted the language of community policing while the core functions of policing
have not changed from the traditional police performance model.
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the procedural fairness perspective proceeds from an individual motive-based model of
trust that puts emphasis on the quality of interpersonal treatment and decision-making as
the core components of improving perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy
(Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Murphy and Tyler 2017).
Examining historical attempts to influence public trust in police and understanding
where those attempts are weak is important to developing a more complete conceptual
picture of how police action influences public perceptions of police. This is certainly the
case with the procedural fairness perspective which built upon the lessons of the police
performance and community policing models to focus on the conduct of officers during
interpersonal interactions with members of the public. However, while the procedural
fairness perspective contributes greatly to understanding how perceived procedural
fairness in police-public encounters can lead to increased perceptions of police
trustworthiness and legitimacy, thinking about trust in police can still be extended. It is the
goal of this paper to highlight two related points which delve deeper into the factors that
influence trust in police. The first is that because individuals are embedded into social
networks and those networks influence the individual’s behavior that dealing with mistrust
of the police must be expanded if it is to counteract the influence of that network. The
second is that the most recent effort at trust-building, the procedural fairness perspective,
needs a normative foundation to guide its implementation and use or it could be used as
window-dressing to deal with negative public relations crises as the police performance
model and the community policing philosophy before it.
The remainder of this essay unfolds as follows. The first section presents an
historical review of literature organized around the theme of police organizational attempts
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in the United States to improve perceptions of trustworthiness and legitimacy. Based on
the review, section two provides two arguments for extending thinking about trust in police,
namely, a) that trust-building more generally and procedural fairness more specifically
need to be grounded in a normative framework to guide the exercise of public authority in
such a way that procedural fairness can work and b) that focusing only on individual policepublic interactions as the unit of trust analysis does not adequately account for the influence
of social networks on individual decisions. Section three brings these two extensions
together into a conceptual model before concluding.

Review of Literature

Police Performance. While it is not stated outright, implicit in the traditional crime
control and deterrence model of policing is the notion that how well police do their jobs
influences citizen satisfaction with and instrumental trust in police. If the public do not
perceive the police as at least somewhat competent at their jobs they are unlikely to reward
them with a high degree of satisfaction, trust or legitimacy. The genesis of the performance
model can be traced back to the inception of the so-called professional era of policing
instituted in the 1930s (and continued well on into the present day) which sought to change
the image of policing in the eyes of the public (Fogelson 1977; Kelling and Moore 1988;
Greene 2000). Until that time, policing in the United States was deeply intertwined with
local politics as ward bosses and their political machines used publicly funded police forces
to secure their community power base (e.g., distributing rewards in exchange for favorable
voting behavior, etc.), leading to a reputation for abuse of police authority and the
corruption of police institutions. The rise of the municipal reform movement and the
8

passage of the Pendleton Act (1883) saw major changes in the way police forces were
organized and their relationship to local political authorities: police would become the most
autonomous part of municipal government. Police reformers August Vollmer (1876-1955)
and O.W. Wilson’s (1900-1972) vision for a reformed police force was to adopt a narrow
crime-fighting focus similar to what J. Edgar Hoover had done with the F.B.I. Police would
become highly professional, adopting an impersonal, authoritative demeanor when
interacting with citizens, and incorporate the latest in rapid response technology to improve
police performance and to project force across entire cities. The goal of these reforms was
to make the police more predictable, official and to imbue them with specialized crimecontrol and deterrence knowledge which would, in turn, rehabilitate the image of the police
in the public’s eyes and regain their trust through police professionalism and performance.
The professional era of policing was born.
The heyday of the professional era model of gaining trust through performance
lasted until the late 1960s/early 1970s when it met with a series of issues that highlighted
some of its weaknesses. The first issue with the professional era’s police performance
model is that police performance, like that of other public services, is empirically difficult
to assess because police work is multifaceted and often unseen by the public (e.g., Parks,
et al. 1981). In the case of police work, it is frequently assumed that police performance
can be measured based on arrest, clearance and crime rates or numbers of calls for service
each have their own weaknesses (see: O’Brien 1996; Alpert and Moore 1993; Alpert, Flynn
and Piquero 2001; Connell, Miggans and McGloin 2008). However, arrest and clearance
rates may be high without leading to a reduction in crime rate because such rates do not
account for the disposition of a case (i.e., how many cleared cases resulted in a conviction,
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how many suspects were arrested without charges being brought, etc.). The number of calls
for service can be influenced by both the presence or absence of satisfaction with and trust
in police services, therefore making it a poor measure police performance. Further, research
into the effectiveness of police tactics revealed that police working by themselves could do
little to prevent, deter or solve crimes. Moore and Kelling (1983) state that in cases of
property crimes without witnesses, police were successful in solving them (i.e., bringing
charges against a suspect, being adjudicated in court) one out of five times (see also:
Spelman and Brown 1984; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman and Brown 1974; see also: Sampson,
Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Moreover, although crime
control and deterrence at its most essential level tries to be a preventative strategy, it tends
in practice to be reactive, which raises questions regarding the role police play in crime
control and deterrence. Thus, although police performance was in theory related to the
ability of police to control and deter crime, providing evidence to support that claim proved
difficult.
Related to the difficulty of measuring empirically police performance, the second
issue for the model was that the non-crime control-based order maintenance activities were
more effective at increasing the public’s perception of safety and, by extension, the amount
of trust they placed in police. Findings from several foot patrol experiments nationwide
found that fear of crime, not actual crime rates, was driven by public perceptions of social
disorder (Spelman and Brown 1984; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman and Brown 1974; Bursik and
Grasmick 1993). The discovery that perceptions of order and not actual crime rates was
related to citizen fear of crime challenged one of the core tenets of professional policing
model, namely, that perceptions of public safety would lead to satisfaction with and trust
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in police through police performance (Greene 2000). Researchers discovered that visible
signs of disorder, including but not limited to graffiti, vagrancy, public intoxication,
abandoned parks and broken windows were interpreted as signals by local residents and
potential offenders that public spaces were unmonitored and unprotected, which had the
effect of driving residents out of those spaces and back into their residences while
simultaneously inviting anti-social elements into them (Wilson and Kelling 1982; see also
Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Although maintaining public
order had always been a considered a component of police work, since the professional era,
order maintenance was viewed as the secondary role of police behind the primary role of
the police as crime-fighting experts. But if perceptions of safety, and, by extension, the
decision to trust police are related to the secondary role and not the first, however, questions
can be raised regarding the claims made about that model.
The third problem with the professional era’s performance model was that the
adoption of rapid patrol and response technology had isolated police socially from the
public which meant that opportunities for trust-building and information gathering were
reduced (Greene 1987, 2000; Kelling and Moore 1988; Moore and Kelling 1983;
Trojanowicz 1986). Along with the discovery that the police could do little to control and
deter crime by themselves was the parallel realization that police needed public cooperation
with the police (e.g., willingness to follow police directives, willingness to pass on
information) in order to carry out their primary function effectively. The problem for the
professional era performance model was that it had lost trust and legitimacy in the eyes of
a proportion of the public, particularly among minority groups living in disadvantaged,
high crime neighborhoods, through the impersonal way officers treated members of the
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public, the use of increasingly militant tactics and the social isolation inherent in choice of
transportation modality (i.e., driving a patrol car versus walking a beat) (Greene 2000; Gill,
et al. 2014). Coupled with the previous two issues, isolating police from the public only
served to make police officers’ jobs more difficult and less likely to provide evidence of
effective police performance, which meant that the likelihood of the police changing public
perceptions of trust was low.

In all, despite its intuitive appeal, the professional era’s police performance model
represents an early attempt and failure at garnering public satisfaction with, trust in and
legitimacy for the institution of the police. A variety of issues, including measurement
problems, role mismatch and social isolation undermined the model and left scholars and
practitioners searching for an alternative that would directly address the public’s lack of
trust in the police. The Community era of policing would build upon the foundation laid
by the professional era and to deploy a new philosophy: community policing.

Community Policing. The community policing philosophy was developed in part
as a response to the shortcomings of the professional era’s police performance model of
crime control and deterrence: crime rates soared during the 1970s while police tactics
before and during race riots were scrutinized in national commission reports on crime and
police clashed violently with civil rights activists and Vietnam anti-war protesters on
broadcast television (Rosenbaum 1988, Greene 2000; Gill et al. 2014). At the same time,
two important discoveries – that fear of crime and disorder led members of the public to
abandon public spaces and that police could do little to control and deter crime by
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themselves – highlighted the need for a new approach to crime control that focused on
order maintenance and the strengthening of neighborhood informal social control (Wilson
and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1986; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). To make this new strategy
work required cooperation between the police and the public to monitor public spaces and
report crime. But attaining public cooperation would prove difficult for two reasons. First,
police organizational legitimacy and performance was undermined by their seeming
inability to control soaring crime rates (Greene 2000; Kelling and Moore 1988). Second,
and most relevant for the topic of this paper, cooperation requires the public to trust the
police, and for many, particularly among communities of color, trust was not immediately
forthcoming.
The community policing philosophy has thus been studied over the past 40 years
for its potential to a) reduce crime and fear of crime and b) improve police-public relations
(Greene 2000; Fisher-Stewart 2007; Crowl 2017; Gill, et al. 2014). The most general
conceptual model for community policing holds that increases in the quantity of policepublic interactions will lead to greater crime control, deterrence, reductions in fear of crime
and improvements in public trust for police (Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988: 8). It
was thought to build trust between the police and the public through increased opportunities
for social interaction as both groups work together to co-produce/improve a
neighborhood’s capacity for informal social control which together can indirectly have an
impact on crime rates (Greene 2000; Trojanowicz, Gaines, Kappeler and Bucqueroux
1998). Community policing officers would also get out of their cars and walk a
geographically stable beat to maximize opportunities for intelligence gathering and trustbuilding (Trojanowicz 1986).
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Co-production was also a major theme of the community policing philosophy. Coproduction is the idea that the consumers of a particular good or service can also contribute
to the production of that good or service (for an overview, see: Parks, et al. 1981). Coproduction is thought to be a way of making the providers of a public good or service more
responsive to the needs of the people they served. Thus, in the case of community policing,
the police and the community might come together to work on a neighborhood watch
program in which police would hear from residents regarding crime problems in that area
and then, with the community, engage in problem-solving to deal with that problem (e.g.,
Alpert and Moore 1993; Alpert, Flynn and Piquero 2001).
Community policing reformers proposed three changes to the structure and
mandate of police organizations to facilitate these goals (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines
and Bucqueroux 1998; Kelling and Moore 1988; Cordner 2001). First, whereas the
professional era’s organizational structure was a strict vertical hierarchy with decisionmaking authority resting at the top, community policing advocated a decentralized
framework that gave greater latitude to officers in the field to deal with issues and thus to
be more responsive to neighborhood or community concerns (Cordner 2001; Rosenbaum
1988). It has been argued that increasing the discretion available to “street-level
bureaucrats” such as police will afford them more flexibility in problem-solving and even
increase the likelihood of achieving socially equitable outcomes (Lipsky 2010; MaynardMoody, Musheno and Musheno 2003; Maynard-Moody and Leland 2000).
Second, order maintenance activities which had during the professional era taken a
secondary role to professional crime-fighting became a core component of efforts to
combat fear of crime and encourage the public to retake their guardianship role over public
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spaces (Cordner 2001; Rosenbaum 1988; Goldstein 1979). Police cannot be everywhere,
so the public must contribute to monitoring and enforcing informal neighborhood order
(Rosenbaum 1988). If visible signs of disorder create fear and make citizens avoidant of
public spaces, restoring neighborhood order should lead again to public participation
(Wilson and Kelling 1982). In reprioritizing order maintenance activities, reformers sought
to create opportunities for police-public collaboration which would strengthen the informal
capacity of the neighborhood to fight crime and maintain order.
Third, and a corollary of the decentralization of decision-making authority,
community policing sought to incorporate the public more into the problem-solving
process for crime in their area (Goldstein 1979; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson 2011;
Gill et al. 2014). As with prioritizing order maintenance activities, incorporating residents
into the process of finding solutions to local crime problems creates opportunities for social
interactions and goal-driven cooperation which has been found in other contexts to
generate social capital and trust between and among participants (see: Putnam, 2000;
Ostrom 1990; Sampson 2012). Bringing residents into the problem-solving process would
likely also result in some informational spillovers that would make residents more effective
at controlling and deterring future disturbances to neighborhood order (Gill et al. 2014;
Goldstein 1979; Bursik and Grasmick 1993).
However, like the professional era’s police performance model before it, the impact
of community policing on crime, fear of crime and trust in police has been difficult to
assess empirically, and this difficulty can be attributed to the lack of a coherent conceptual
model connecting the content of community policing programs to specific outcomes
(Fielding 2005; Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1986; Gill et al. 2014). There is currently no
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explicit theoretical foundation for community policing or conceptual model upon which
criminal justice scholars agree (e.g., Cordner 2001; Oliver and Bartgis 1998), though a few
prominent researchers (e.g., Kelling and Moore 1988; Trojanowicz 1986; Moore,
Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988: 8) have alluded the existence of such an underlying social
interaction theory for community policing but this theory has not been developed or
mentioned in subsequent research. A consequence of the lack of theoretical foundation has
been that although community policing programs can be found in most metropolitan police
departments across the United States (Zhao and Thurman 1997; Zhao, Lovrich and
Robinson 2001), community policing programs bear little resemblance to one another and
thus generally defy comparison (e.g., Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Lurigio and
Rosenbaum 1994; Gill et al., 2014). Even on occasions where comparison is possible (e.g.,
similarly sized patrol beats, police department size, experimental and control areas, etc.),
few studies describe in detail what police did during the program which is of great interest
to researchers looking to reveal causality (Connell, Miggans and McGloin 2008).
As of the time of writing and to the best of this author’s knowledge, there are no
studies which specifically assess the impact of community policing activities on trust in
police, which makes assessing community policing’s trust-building component unfeasible.
This finding was a surprise given the number of scholars advancing the claim that
community policing involves trust-building (e.g., Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and
Bucqueroux 1998). There have been a number of studies that have looked at public
satisfaction with policing services which compare the service delivery of large, highly
centralized urban police departments characteristic of the police performance model with
smaller, more decentralized community police departments indicative of community
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policing units (e.g., Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 1974). While not a direct measure of trust,
satisfaction with service findings can at least be argued on conceptual grounds to be a
correlate of trust: if an individual is satisfied with a particular service or product, in all
likelihood that individual also trusts the quality of the products and services delivered by
that producer and will continue to use them (e.g., Ranaweera and Prabhu 2003).
The empirical record for community policing’s effect on crime has been mixed.
Systematic analysis of community policing’s effectiveness has been rare (Weisburd and
Eck 2004). In their comprehensive review of the community policing literature since 1970,
Gill et al. (2014: 412) found that in only 36.2% of the 47 comparison studies they surveyed
showed a positive effect (i.e., reduction) on crime while an equal proportion indicated the
opposite. Further, using longitudinal data to analyze a community policing program
deployed in the suburbs, Connell, Miggans and McGloin (2008), who studied the impact
of an officer-initiated community policing initiative on crime located in the suburbs of a
major metropolitan area, concluded that the program was successful at lowering property
crime rates in the area as a result of police-citizen interaction, but they also mentioned that
their assessment was only possible because of the in-depth description of the intervention
provided by police.
The community policing philosophy is, despite its indeterminate empirical record,
an important step on the path to improving the police-public trust relationship. Community
policing reformers, aware of the importance of personal contact and non-enforcementrelated social interaction to gaining trust and cooperation in enforcement-related situations,
set forth to design an approach to policing that at least nominally assigned a greater degree
of importance to the police-public trust relationship. While community policing continues
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to be a topic of consideration in the criminal justice literature on police-public cooperation,
another more empirically grounded theory has risen to prominence in the search for
improving public perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy. That theory is the
procedural fairness (justice) perspective.

Procedural Fairness. Despite the indeterminant effect of community policing on
trust in police, the community policing philosophy highlighted conceptually the
importance of social interactions for building positive perceptions of police officers and
police institutions. Like the community policing philosophy before it, the procedural
fairness and police legitimacy argument builds upon the insights gleaned from the previous
generation’s efforts. However, unlike the police performance and community policing
models, procedural fairness has an empirical micro-foundation which supports its core
claim. This has translated into the procedural fairness and police legitimacy perspective
receiving a great deal of scholarly attention in efforts to rehabilitate the image of police
officers and institutions.
The procedural fairness position holds that procedural fairness predicts trust in
police and improves perceptions of police legitimacy (Tyler 1990, 2003). Legitimacy for
police is important because individuals who view the police as legitimate are more likely
to defer to them, cooperate with them and obey the law (Tyler 1990). The evaluation of
procedural fairness takes places across two distinct axes: the quality of interpersonal
treatment and the quality of decision-making (Tyler and Blader 2000). The quality of
interpersonal treatment refers to the degree to which officers treat members of the public
with dignity and respect while the quality of decision-making deals with the extent to which
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officers explain their decisions, are perceived to be neutral and allow for members of the
public to provide input. Perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy are improved
when police officers treat people fairly and with respect, explaining why officers made a
particular decision and inviting and respecting input from those with whom they come into
contact. If people witness police interacting with members of the public in these ways or
are themselves subject to them, they infer that the larger organization is procedurally fair
and therefore have trust in the institution of the police as well as support that institution’s
policies as legitimate, which means that they are more likely to cooperate with police and
follow the law (Tyler 1990 2003, 2005; Murphy and Tyler 2017; Hough, Jackson and
Bradford 2013; Tyler and Fagan 2008). Fairness of interactions is determined by individual
subjective perceptions; there are no universal standards by which procedural fairness is
measured (Tyler 2003).
The empirical base supporting the claim that the legitimacy of police institutions is
derived from citizens’ subjective perceptions that those institutions are procedurally fair is
robust, both within its original Anglo-American context (Hinds and Murphy 2007;
Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003; Tyler and Blader 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002) and
outside in places such as Ghana, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary (e.g.,
Tankebe 2009; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012; Moravcová 2016). Research into
procedural fairness looks not only on its impact on individual perceptions of police
legitimacy alone but has also compared procedural fairness to other predictors of
willingness to trust and cooperate with police: distributive justice and police performance.
Although the convergent and discriminant validity of the procedural fairness concept
remains a source of tension (Gau 2011), the prevailing result has been that, ceteris paribus,
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procedural fairness remains the most important predictor of public cooperation with police.
For example, Tyler and Sunshine (2003) in a survey of over 1,600 residents of New York
examining the antecedents of procedural justice found that, across all ethnicities, the
quality of decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment comprised the main
predictors of procedural fairness. In that same study, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) report on
the factors which influence public support of police and policing activities and discovered
that perceptions of police legitimacy predict cooperation and compliance with the police
and the willingness to entrust police with broader discretion in their everyday tasks of
maintaining law and order. The findings of Sunshine and Tyler (2003) echo the findings of
Tyler and Huo (2002) in a survey of 1,656 people living in and around Oakland and Los
Angeles which indicated individuals’ evaluations of procedural fairness predicted both
their satisfaction with the decision-maker and their willingness to accept a decision.
However, even though the effects of procedural fairness are improved perceptions of
trustworthiness and legitimacy, much of the evidence supporting these effects uses trust as
an explanatory variable examining the impact of different types of trust (e.g., trust in
procedural fairness, trust in distributive fairness) on self-reported willingness to comply
with the law and legal authorities (see: Tyler 2005; Jackson, Hough, Bradford, Hohl and
Kuha 2012; Hough Jackson and Bradford 2013; Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton 2017).

This review of literature on previous research into trust in police highlights the
major theme in the development of thinking regarding generating trust in police, which is
the need for police and public to trust one another and work together. The irony of police
performance model of the professional era was that the adoption of rapid response
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technologies and a professional, paternalistic demeanor by police, both of which were
designed to rehabilitate the reputation of police in the United States from being corrupt and
political to being beyond reproach and neutral, were arguably the factors which contributed
to an overall decrease in police effectiveness at stopping or deterring crime as police
became isolated from the public. The simultaneous recognition that the public and the
police co-produce public safety meant that, in order to maximize the use of limited police
resources, cooperation between the police and the public was necessary in order to produce
public safety (co-production). Police efforts to reach the public became the defining
characteristic of the community policing philosophy. Getting police out of cars and closer
to the people, despite its order maintenance purposes, was a clear attempt at putting police
and the public into situations where they might engage in social interactions. Creating
opportunities for police and public to work together to bring about changes in the safety of
their neighborhoods is in-line with research suggesting that co-production generates social
capital and trust (e.g., Ostrom and Ahn 2008; Putnam 2000). Unfortunately, the community
policing philosophy lacked coherence as an organizational change philosophy and its goal
of improving the police-public trust relationship eventually took a backseat to familiar
crime control and deterrence strategies. The community policing philosophy also did not
explicitly theorize on how to generate trust and cooperation when it was not forthcoming,
as was the case in high crime, high poverty areas and minority communities. The
procedural fairness perspective utilizes advances in social psychology to address the lack
of theorization on social interactions and trust in the community policing and police
performance models. Procedural fairness operates in interactions between police and the
public by treating members of the public with dignity and respect and by appearing neutral
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and transparent in decision-making. Empirical research backs up the procedural fairness
perspective’s claims to this, which also departs from previous scholarship.

Two Critiques and an Extension

When it comes to understanding what people consider procedurally fair in
encounters with police, the procedural fairness perspective is well-equipped to provide an
answer, but there are two ways in which thinking about trust in police more broadly and
procedural fairness more specifically can be extended to provide a more nuanced
understanding of what influences public trust in police. The first is that although people
respond favorably to procedural fairness, without a normative principle to guide its
application, the procedural fairness perspective may fall into a “procedural trap” wherein
authorities use procedures to focus attention away from substantive issues like systemic
racism, abuse of authority and state-sanctioned violence. The second is that the procedural
fairness perspective’s focus is on the individual social interaction, but the presence of a
social network effect for trust in police would mean that people are often influenced in
their decision to adopt a particular behavior by the prevalence of that behavior in their
reference group and thus that the decision to trust is affected by more than individual social
interactions. The extension is that universal impartiality is needed for an indirect big bang
approach to get out of the procedural (and social) trap.

Universal impartiality. The community policing philosophy has been criticized as
being window dressing for police departments that find themselves in difficult political
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situations with the public they serve (e.g., Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux
1998; Gill et al. 2014; Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Zhao,
Lovrich and Robinson 2001; Zhao, He and Lovrich 2003). Police executives could then
proclaim that they were “doing something” to address citizen concerns about police
violence, abuse of authority, systemic racism and other forms of corruption without taking
other steps to reform or reorganize their organization or while using the language of
community policing as a “cover for use of aggressive law enforcement tactics rather than
serving the needs of their communities” (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux
1998: 3; see also: Crank 1994; Crank and Langworthy 1992). Supporting this claim is a
study by Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson (2001) which examined change in three core
functions of American policing under community policing (crime control, order
maintenance and service provision) using panel data from national surveys of more than
200 municipal police departments conducted between 1993 and 1996 2. Their findings
indicated that the three core functions of police have remained mostly unchanged during
that period which the authors comment “seems to represent a method of strategic buffering
of a largely unaltered core police operation reflective of the professional model” (ibid.:
365; see also: Zhao, He and Lovrich 2003).
The problem with the community policing philosophy, and to a similar extent the
police performance and procedural fairness perspectives, is that they are essentially
consequentialist in nature. They focus attention on the benefits to society of increased trust

2

Although scholars differ on the starting decade for the community policing philosophy, a number of
researchers have identified the 1990s as the high watermark for community policing, particularly after then
President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which created the
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to disburse discretionary funds to police agencies claiming
to engage in community policing (e.g., Zhao, Scheider and Thurman 2002).
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in police, improved perceptions of police legitimacy and greater public compliance with
the law, all of which are laudable goals, but if there is no normative framework to guide
the behavior of the organization, that it could fall into what Tankebe calls a “procedural
trap” in which “legal and political authorities tend to focus attention on procedural justice
in order to deflect attention away from more substantive issues” (2009: 14). In other words,
much in the same way that the community policing philosophy was criticized for being a
means of placating public outcry over police behavior (Greene and Mastrofski 1988;
Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux 1998), the
procedural fairness perspective is an instrument that can be used to fulfill the agenda of
whoever wields it because the basis of fairness judgments are the subjective evaluations of
individuals in contact with the police rather than a universal value or norm. What is needed
to gain broad-based trust and legitimacy in police is the adoption of a normative framework
to guide organizational behavior, such as Bo Rothstein’s Quality of Government thesis,
which contends that public agencies which exercise their authority in a universal and
impartial way enjoy greater trust and legitimacy because police tactics like those employed
in the procedural fairness argument because they are intrinsically valuable given the
inherent value of human life (Rothstein 2011).
Rothstein defines impartiality in the execution of public authority in the following
way: “[W]hen implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into
consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not stipulated beforehand in the policy
or the law” (Rothstein 2011: 13). In other words, when wielding public power, agents of
the state should do so in a predictable and unbiased way, in accordance with legal
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stipulations3. Rothstein does not mean by this that no concerns other than those enshrined
in law beforehand should be taken into account; it would be reasonable, for example, for
time and budget constraints to be considered. But rather he places emphasis on the fact that
no characteristics of the citizen or case outside of those stipulated in law or policy should
be taken into consideration. He writes: “QoG [Quality of Government] as impartiality is
procedural, which means that it can encompass very different policies and does not rule
out support for specific groups or interests” (Rothstein 2011: 14). By way of example,
Rothstein submits that, in terms of social policy, it would not violate the principle of
impartiality to enact a law supporting poor families with children, but denying those same
benefits to people from a specific ethnic background or to parents with a particular sexual
orientation would (ibid.).
The argument made for universal impartiality being the basic norm which guides
the exercise of police authority is that impartiality is, in addition to other police models
reviewed in this paper, an important factor predicting trust in police, not a replacement for
it. Much of the research on procedural fairness indicates that, net of other influences,
including police performance and distributive fairness, procedural fairness is the most
important predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police. However, trust is usually
an explanans for self-reported compliance behavior rather than the outcome variable.
Despite this, the standard claim about the workings of procedural fairness is that it
improves perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy, so at least on a conceptual

3

It is important to note here that Rothstein’s conceives of laws as necessarily affirming human rights and
dignity, which makes his view on impartiality similar in practice to the German rechstaat in which the power
of the state is constrained by the law. The rechstaat is similar to the Anglo-American concept of rule of law
but differs in that it also emphasizes what is just based on equity, philosophy, ethics, law, etc. In this way,
the rechstaat protects citizens from the arbitrary use of power by the state.
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level procedural fairness should influence trust in police. A handful of studies have also
compared the procedural fairness to the professional era police performance model in terms
of which better predicts self-reported compliance with the law (e.g., Jackson et al. 2012;
Hough, et al. 2013; Tyler 2005). The inclusion of police performance in a model exploring
the impact of procedural fairness and universal impartiality on trust in police would be
justified on the grounds that a) police performance makes an implicit trust claim and b)
given the findings of Zhao, He and Lovrich (2003) that the core functions of policing have
changed little from the days of the police performance model, it can be argued that that
police performance model never really fell out of fashion and thus represents the standard
way in which police organizations operate. Rothstein does not explicitly state that
impartiality should lead to increased trust in police, but he does argue that governments
which do not practice the ideal of impartiality in the implementation of public policy are
viewed as illegitimate and untrustworthy (Rothstein 2011).
It might be argued by some that procedural fairness and impartiality are the same
thing. It is problematic that both Tyler and Rothstein interchange the terms “fair” and
“impartial” in their work. Although both theories use these terms as near synonyms, these
terms differ in two important ways. First, as has been previously discussed, Tyler’s fairness
is based upon subjective perceptions of police treatment from the perspective of the
individual which means that what is fair can vary depending upon the individual doing the
evaluating. Under this subjective view of fairness, it is possible that an action may be
deemed fair by one person, yet that action may not be impartial. Someone may sanction
aggressive policing tactics towards and harsher sentences for individuals from a particular
ethnic background and see this as fair, but the actions the individual proposes would not

26

be universally impartial because the tactics do not apply to everyone and are not stipulated
by law. Universal impartiality, on the other hand, is an absolute: it applies to everyone
(universal) and individuals are either regarded impartially (i.e., reliably and without bias)
or not. In this way, universal impartiality is the expectation and the value by which
judgments regarding fairness ought to be made. This makes fairness a necessary but not
sufficient condition for impartiality, because while it is possible to say that all which is
impartial is fair, it is not possible to say that all which is fair is also impartial.
The second way in which procedural fairness and impartiality are different is that
impartiality is concerned with the exercise of public authority whereas procedural fairness
is concerned with the posture taken by agents of the state when interacting with the public,
meaning that impartiality is a more encompassing concept that procedural fairness. Fair
procedure is concerned with the subjective perceptions of the fairness of those who are
subject to the “procedures” but not to the substantive criminal procedures, such as offering
a Miranda warning, having the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment, etc. Impartiality, by contrast, would apply to the manner in
which police interact with members of the public (all citizens deserve to be treated with
dignity and to understand what is happening to them) as well as to the substantive content
of criminal procedure (all citizens deserve a Miranda warning, all citizens should be
protected in their persons from harm while in custody, etc.).

Social network effects. The second critique in thinking about trust in police is that
the procedural fairness perspective’s focus on individual social interactions does not
acknowledge the fact that people are often influenced in their decision to adopt a particular
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behavior by the prevalence of that behavior in their reference group and thus that the
decision to trust is influenced by more than individual social interactions. It is not entirely
clear from the police performance model or the community policing philosophy how police
ought to engage the community so as to bring about a trust-based outcome, though for
community policing it is likely that it used the same the sort of blanket approach taken by
the police performance perspective. Tyler’s conceptual model of process-based regulation
begins with the procedural elements of a police-public interaction leading to individuallevel outcomes such as general cooperation, compliance, empowerment, and immediate
and long-term police decision acceptance (see Figure 1). Except for the police performance
and community policing models, the procedural fairness perspective focuses almost
exclusively on individual experiences with police.

[FIGURE 1]

But if generating trust in police were only a function of changing police tactics,
then the procedural fairness model would be sufficient to change individual perceptions of
police trustworthiness and legitimacy. People can be influenced in their decision to trust
by the aggregate behavior of their social reference group – in other words, by the presence
of a social network effect. A social network effect is defined as “the propensity of an
individual to behave in some way with the prevalence of that behaviour in some reference
group containing that individual” (Manski 1993: 531). Previous research outside of
criminal justice has uncovered the presence of a social network effect for wearing a
particular fashion (e.g., Gladwell 2000), automobile ownership (e.g., Goetzke and
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Weinberger 2012) and obesity (e.g., Christakis and Fowler 2007; Fowler and Christakis
2008). Given the discovery of social network effects in such an array of different
disciplines, it would not be a stretch to think that a social network effect for trust in police
exists.
It is worth noting that specific study of social network effects in the criminal justice
literature is limited. Brunson and Weitzer (2011), in a set of in-depth interviews with longterm residents in East and West St. Louis regarding whether, and if so how, citizens prepare
for their contacts with officers before face-to-face encounters, point to the lack of network
analysis in research explaining variation in perceptions of the police. They write: “Scholars
are just beginning to study the role of vicarious influences, so this remains a significant
gap in the literature on police-citizen relations. Indeed, most research continues to focus
on individual-level factors rather than interpersonal influences on citizen perceptions of the
police” (429). Their own study found that almost all the African American adults
interviewed had transmitted to youth a “repertoire of ‘best practices’ in their contacts with
officers” which were designed to reduce the chances of altercations and arrests of young
people (ibid.: 449). Brunson and Weitzer further recommend that much more research
should investigate the role reference group influences play in shaping attitudes toward the
police (2011: 451).
A great number of studies have indicated that negative experiences with police
officers and the criminal justice system are shared through family and friend networks or
as a result of spatial proximity, though it should be noted that in these studies the authors
were not explicitly looking for the presence of a social network effect: Feagin (1991) was
exploring the effect of modern racial discrimination on middle class blacks; Brunson and

29

Miller (2006) and Brunson (2007) were looking at the experiences of African-American
youth with law enforcement. For example, Feagin (1991) argues that in order to understand
why individuals from different groups perceive discrimination differently it is important
not only to consider the “cumulative character of an individual’s experiences with
discrimination” but also “the group’s accumulated historical experiences as perceived by
the individual” (114, emphasis added). Furthermore, Brunson and Miller (2006),
performed in-depth interviews with 40 African American male and 35 African American
female youth interviewees from St. Louis, Missouri, about their experiences and
expectations for law enforcement. Over 90% of males and 85% of females indicated that
they witnessed or knew someone who had been harassed or mistreated by the police, and
describe in detail how other young men and women in their neighborhood are routinely
treated by police, most of which involved police violence or other misconduct toward
family and friends, which fostered anger and distrust toward the police. Moreover, Brunson
(2007) in detailed interviews with 40 African American youth living in St. Louis city and
county found that “[r]espondents offered detailed secondhand accounts of people being
beaten by the police” and that most study participants “acknowledged that they had heard
about many more instances of police violence than they had actually seen” (91). Brunson
argues that regardless whether the secondhand accounts proved true, those accounts
“reinforced study participants’ widespread beliefs about discriminatory policing practices”
(2007: 92). Perhaps the most specific example of a social network effect is given by Dr.
David J. Thomas, retired police officer and Senior Research Fellow at the National Police
Foundation, in a blog post about the need for law enforcement to regain the public’s trust,
when he writes: “The stories of the sheriff and the slave patrols play a part in the distrust
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that the African American community has for law enforcement. These stories have been
told for generations. As a child, I was told the stories by my father, who was born in 1914,
and my grandfather, who was born in the late 1800s” (Thomas, n.d.).
One interpretation of the consequences of the presence of a social network effect
for trust in police is that police trust might be path dependent. Social network effects imply
multiple equilibria, or, to put it another way, that there can be different outcomes
(equilibria) for trust in police (e.g., trust/not trust). Some of the outcomes for a social
network effect are dynamic (unstable) and others are static (stable). The dynamic (unstable)
equilibria can be “tipped” toward one static (stable) outcome or another if a critical share
of the social reference group adopts that outcome (Gladwell 2000: 12; Grodzins 1957;
Schelling 1971); however, as Arthur warns: “There is no guarantee that the particular
outcome selected from among the many alternatives will be the ‘best’ one” (Arthur 1994:
1). The stable equilibria are the static path dependent outcomes which, owing to their
stability, are very difficult to change and can persist over time. Path dependency thus
represents a self-reinforcement mechanism in which each step along a given path makes
continuing along that path easier while switching course becomes more costly (Arthur
1994; Pierson 2000).
The idea that static equilibria are “sticky” and resist direct efforts to change is
similar to the sociological concept of collective memory. Collective memory refers to the
“memory and representations of group pasts – whether these be ethnic, global, or other
collective historical events” (Teeger 2014: 7). Bo Rothstein argues that collective
memories are important to understanding an individual’s choice of strategy as they
(collective memories) become a source of information regarding which individuals and
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groups in society can be trusted. Rothstein thinks that in some societies, low trust social
traps -- scenarios in which people could be made better off if they choose to cooperate but
do not because no one wants to be the first to change -- are the result of collective memory.
He writes: “The problem of low interpersonal trust comes from discriminated groups
having been forced to live under public political institutions that have been, or which they
have believed to have been, deeply dysfunctional for them. The collective memory of
things such as gross police brutality, public lynchings and systemic discrimination has a
tremendous effect on the belief systems of which the individuals in a group such as this
become the bearers” (Rothstein 2005: 127-128).
In the context of police trust, social network effects (tipping points) and path
dependency (collective memory) might explain the persistence of mistrust toward police
found among African Americans and other minority groups in the United States. Historical
police violence toward minority groups, housing segregation and Jim Crow undoubtedly
had an impact on these group’s level of trust in police: the beginning of this paper
referenced the perpetually low levels of trust and confidence in the police surveyed among
African Americans but also that trust in police among Hispanics is also on the decrease;
trust in the police for both groups has never broken the 50% point (Norman 2017). The
idea that historical institutions can influence contemporary attitudes and behaviors is given
support by the burgeoning literature on the persistent effect of historical institutions (for an
overview, see: Nunn 2009). For example, Tankebe (2008; see also Tankebe 2009) traces
contemporary police characteristics such as human rights violations, police corruption and
police impunity to the operating organizational philosophy of former British colonial
police. He points out that “[t]hese abuses have alienated the police even more from many
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Ghanaians, which leads to significant distrust in the official mission of the police—
‘service with integrity’” (Tankebe 2009: 1271). There are additional, non-police related
examples as well: researchers have explored the link between historically high
concentrations of slaves and persistent levels of inequality, weak institutions, violent and
property crime in Colombia (Buonanno and Vargas 2016) and Brazil (Fujiwara, Laudares
and Valencia C. 2019), a “Hapsburg effect” for government trust (Becker, Boeckh, Hainz
and Woessmann 2011) and the location of historical lynchings, anti-Civil Rights
Movement violence and contemporary voting behavior among African Americans
(Peterson and Ward 2015).

Extension. The question for police trust and legitimacy scholars is how to get out
of a path dependent low police trust trap and “tip” a sufficient share of individuals toward
trust in police. The procedural fairness perspective offers a conceptual model highlighting
how individual interpersonal interactions between police and members of the public can
lead to evaluations of procedural fairness, trustworthiness and legitimacy for police (e.g.,
Tyler 1990, 2003, 2005; Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003) and may be
efficacious in dealing with the presence of social network effects (tipping points) and path
dependency (collective memory), but because the model does not explicitly address them,
they are unlikely to be factored into consideration of the police trust problem. Fortunately,
Rothstein (2005, 2011) offers some guidance for overcoming collective memory and
breaking out of a low trust social or procedural trap. His first suggestion pertains more
specifically to battling corruption in institutions, but theoretically could work in any
instance where some form of institutional path dependency exists, be that within police or
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neighborhood institutions. Rothstein call this the indirect big bang approach to fighting
corruption, the basic premise of which is that trying to deal with corruption in any
institution incrementally and directly will probably fail because there are systems which
underlie corruption which will resist explicit efforts to tinker with different parts of that
system to try and eliminate that corruption (Rothstein 2011). What is needed is to combat
corruption by getting the institution off balance, or, in other words, by addressing
corruption in large-scale changes that moves too fast for institutional actors to adjust their
tactics.
Rothstein’s indirect big bang approach is clearly applicable to addressing the
influence of social network effects and collective memories for trust in police. Collective
memories cannot be rationally forgotten and attempts at altering perceptions of police
trustworthiness and legitimacy incrementally leaves an overabundance of opportunities for
the larger social network effect to counteract and return to the status quo (Rothstein 2005,
2011). For example, an indirect big bang approach to dealing with the impact of a social
network effect for trust in police might work with key neighborhood or community
institutions on non-law enforcement related matters that challenge the narrative influence
of collective memories in a large-scale and conspicuous manner, somewhat similarly to
programmatic content in community policing but with the major difference that the point
is to challenge the influence of collective memory. The idea here is that police can set the
social network “off-balance” such that individual-level efforts at trust-building might be
successful. The type of indirect big bang approach needed to unbalance the influence of a
social network effect and collective memory might, following Rothstein, be to take as a
guiding normative principle for the exercise of police authority the concept of
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deontological impartiality (2011). Deontological (or universal) impartiality is critical to
escaping low trust social or procedural traps because it shies away from partial, biased
behavior on the part of institutional actors, which has been a recurrent concern among
minority and vulnerable populations regarding police services (e.g., Brunson and Miller
2006; Brunson 2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; Brunson and Weitzer 2011).
Adopting a normative value like universal impartiality might serve to set both police
institutions and the publics they serve off-balance in such a way that changing individual
attitudes and behaviors through procedural fairness becomes possible.

Conclusion

From the review of literature, it is apparent that criminal justice thinking about trust
in police has gone through several stages, with each stage building upon the lessons of the
preceding one. The police performance model moved far away from the highly suspect
image of the previous “political” era of policing toward a more hierarchical, centralized
and professional police department whose strengths were to be controlling and deterring
crime and force projection through the adoption of rapid response technology such as the
patrol car and the wireless radio. Police trust was thus a function of police performance.
The community policing philosophy shifted slightly away from the police performance
model, insomuch as it recognized the importance of police-public relations to controlling
and deterring crime and fear of crime, to a more decentralized organization where decisionmaking authority was delegated down to street-level officers, according them greater
discretion when deciding how to deal with the cases they encountered. Police trust was
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here a function of social interaction and police performance. The procedural fairness
perspective doubled-down on the social interaction aspect of community policing by
concentrating attention on the behavior of police officers during police-public encounters,
specifically on the quality of interpersonal treatment and the quality of decision-making,
which lead to increased perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy. Under
procedural fairness, police trust is a function of officer behavior in interactions.
The critiques proposed in this paper follows this familiar theme. The first critique
suggests that criminal justice thinking about trust in police more generally and procedural
fairness more specifically need to be exercised within a normative framework to avoid
falling into a low trust procedural trap. This is because the police performance and
procedural fairness perspectives are essentially consequentialist in nature, which means
that they can be used cynically to buffer police departments against public criticism of
substantive organizational issues such as police accountability, responsiveness and
corruption. The normative value proposed in this paper to guide the exercise of public
authority is Bo Rothstein’s universal impartiality which holds that governments that
exercise power in a universal, predictable and unbiased (impartial) manner will enjoy
greater trust and legitimacy. Universal impartiality is deontological, meaning that it takes
as its view of persons that they are ends in themselves and should never be treated as a
means. Rothstein’s impartiality is also procedural, and so shares some similarity with the
procedural fairness perspective, but rather than leaving the fairness of interactions to be
evaluated subjectively, Rothstein’s impartiality becomes the measure of fairness.
Impartiality does not replace the procedural fairness perspective’s process-based regulation
model but rather extends it by grounding decisions about procedural fairness in the
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normative framework of impartiality. Police trust therefore becomes a function of
procedural fairness anchored in impartiality. The addition of impartiality to the processbased model can be seen in Figure 2.

[FIGURE 2]

The second critique of criminal justice thinking about trust in police is the idea that
individuals are influenced in their decision to trust not only by the behavior of police during
social interactions but also vicariously through their social networks or peer reference
groups. Excepting the police performance and community policing models, which took a
blanket approach to changing perceptions of police trustworthiness, the procedural fairness
perspectives both focus attention on individual perceptions to the exclusion of all other
influences. This means that the procedural fairness model is not equipped to account for
second-hand or vicarious information regarding police passed along through family and
friend networks, which is problematic for these models as the work street-level officers do
to improve perceptions of trust and legitimacy may be the policing equivalent to shuffling
deck chairs on the Titanic: the non-trusting outcome will arrive regardless. Social network
effects and their path dependent outcomes can be interpreted as the presence of collective
memories. Collective memories include an individual’s cumulative experiences of police
contact as well as the collective experience of being a member of a particular societal group
as interpreted by them. For African Americans and other minority groups, their collective
experiences of the police are filled with state-sanctioned violence, abuse of authority and
corruption. One of the most poignant images of the African American experience with
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police is the photo of Civil Rights marchers going through Selma, Alabama on their way
to the statehouse to protest for their right to vote. On the other side of the Edmund Pettus
bridge were a wall of police officers with night sticks, dogs and fire hoses – not to protect
the marchers but to deter them. Rothstein argues that memories such as the one just
described cannot be rationally forgotten and become part of an individual’s mental map
which tells them who in society is trustworthy. Taking social network effects seriously in
criminal justice means including them and their consequences in conceptual models
accounting for the factors which influence trust in police. Figure 2 shows how collective
memories might fit into the larger structure of individual decision-making as it pertains to
trust in agents of the state in general and police in particular.
In conclusion, it is possible to foresee a couple implications for policy of the
expansion of this conceptual model. The first is that social network effects make switching
course very difficult and costly, but not impossible. Thirty years ago, if you would have
asked the average person what a conflict diamond was, they probably would not have
known. A similar claim could be made about fair trade coffee. Today in 2019, by
comparison, diamonds and coffee are expected to be conflict-free and fair trade. Changing
perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy will not happen overnight, but it can
happen. But the presence of social network effects for trust in police makes change
difficult. The procedural fairness perspective can use this to its advantage. Given that
previous attempts at police reform have achieved mixed outcomes, it is not unreasonable
to think there may be push-back to procedural fairness adoption across police forces.
Linking the procedural fairness model to social network effects provides some impetus for
skeptical police executives. Officers will be able, by their concerted actions, to have an
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impact on levels of trust in local police through network diffusion. This provides another
barometer for assessing the magnitude of a social network effect for trust in police, for
example.
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Figure 2.1. Tyler’s model of process-based regulation

Source: (Tyler 2003: 284)
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Figure 2.2. Expanded model of process-based

Impartiality
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Collective memories
 Group-level experiences as
perceived by individual
 Cumulative individual
experiences

Adapted from: Tyler (2003: 284)

CHAPTER III
TRUST IN POLICE: DOES UNIVERSAL IMPARTIALITY MATTER?
Introduction
Procedural fairness, on its own, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
generate the type of broad-based trust and legitimacy highlighted by social scientists as
essential to the effective operation of government more generally and policing in particular.
A major reason, which forms the basis of the current paper, is that the procedural fairness
argument is essentially consequentialist in that it focuses on the benefits to society of
changing public compliance behavior with the law and legal authorities in the name of the
greater good. While it is true that the means of reaching the kind of broad-based police
trust and legitimacy is not entirely without consideration of how that trust and legitimacy
is achieved, the ends of increased trust in police, improved perceptions of police legitimacy
and greater compliance with the law are advanced as the true goal of police procedural
fairness reform. What is required to achieve the broad-based trust and legitimacy in police
is the adoption of a normative framework to guide the behavior of the organization, such
as the impartiality as Quality of Government thesis, which argues that government
institutions that wield public authority in a universal and impartial manner will enjoy
greater trust and legitimacy because police tactics, such as those employed in procedural
fairness perspective, are intrinsically valuable given that people are inherently valuable and
deserve to be treated with dignity and respect.
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Although the procedural fairness perspective uses the terms “fair” and “impartial”
interchangeably, fair and impartial are not synonyms but rather denote two separate and
distinct concepts: fairness is subjective, and impartiality is deontological. This
deontological position generates trust because people expect that the police and other
government agencies are reliably unbiased and non-discriminatory. The deontological
ethical perspective of Immanuel Kant holds that the moral correctness of any action is
determined by the Categorical Imperative which results in the view that people are ends in
themselves to be treated with dignity and respect. What is missing is for this deontological
position to be tested empirically along with procedural fairness and police performance as
important predictors of trust in police.
Thus, the main question for this paper is whether universal impartiality, in addition
to the procedural fairness and police performance modalities, is a predictor of trust in
police. Procedural fairness and police performance should both remain important
predictors of trust, but universal impartiality will likely also contribute substantively to
overall trust in police. Using European Social Survey data (Round 5), this paper aims to
explore the tension between procedural fairness and impartiality as important predictors of
trust in police. The value of this paper is twofold. First, it empirically evaluates the
importance of predictors for trust in police in light of the arguments for police performance,
procedural fairness and universal impartiality respectively, which has not, at the time of
writing, been accomplished before. Second, it brings into conversation the steadily growing
criminal justice literature on procedural fairness with the political philosophy of
impartiality as Quality of Government.
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The remainder of the article plays out as follows. The first part presents a review of
literature linking police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality to trust
in police. The second section describes the methods and data to be utilized in the analysis.
Section three presents and interprets the results of the analysis and engages in a brief
discussion of the implications of this paper for policy and thinking about generating trust
in police.

Trust in Police: What influences it?
Police performance. Classic crime-control theory says that police performance
predicts trust in police: the better police are at controlling crime, the more the public trust
and support them (Tyler 2005; Kelling and Coles 1997; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The
idea that trust in police and attributions of police legitimacy are based upon police
performance goes back to the inception of the so-called “professional” model of policing
in the 1930s which, owing much to the influence of Taylorism, cast police as crime-fighting
experts, specialists in understanding and controlling the criminal impulses of the anti-social
element of society (Greene 1987, 2000). The performance model of trust in police was
dominant until the late 1960s/early 1970s when the legitimacy of the police was shaken by
several events. First, presidential commission findings indicated that urban race riots were
frequently sparked as much by police behavior as by that of the public (Greene 1987; AbuLughod 2007). Second, anti-war Vietnam and civil rights protesters on college campuses
challenged the legitimacy of police and National Guard orders to disperse by peacefully
refusing to comply while being met with aggressive tactics on the part of both police and
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National Guard members, sometimes to deadly consequences, as in the death of four
student protesters at the Kent State University on May 4th, 1970 (Greene 2000). Third,
studies of police foot patrol performance in high crime neighborhoods found that the fear
of crime was divorced from actual crime rates, indicating that the perception of police
presence and effectiveness was a more important predictor of trust in police and evaluations
of their legitimacy than their actual performance (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988; Skogan
1986; Trojanowicz 1986). Further, these failures of police tactics were televised to families
across the nation, decreasing public sentiments toward police legitimacy, and, by
extension, police’s claim to special knowledge regarding the maintenance of public order
furthering (Greene 2000).
However, the legitimacy of the police and other government agents partly rests on
the perceived competence of these agents to carry out tasks which society perceives as
responsibility of those agents. If police cannot control and prevent crime, which is
frequently the public view of police’s function in society, what would be the point of the
public cooperating them? If the public do not view the police as at least somewhat
competent then they are not likely to trust them to do their jobs nor be willing to cooperate
with them in the provision of public safety. An example of exactly this sentiment is
captured by Brunson (2007) and Brunson and Weitzer (2009). Brunson (2007) interviewed
40 African American males with ages ranging from 13 to 19 living in and around the St.
Louis area about their experiences with and attitudes toward police – including trust -using a mixture of initial survey questions which became prompts during in-depth
qualitative interviews. The teens were routinely frustrated by slow response times for
police, prioritization of calls for service and law enforcement’s inability to prevent and
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solve crime (Brunson 2007: 81; see also Brunson and Miller 2006). When asked on the
survey whether police did a good job preventing crime, 50% responded “Almost never”.
In fact, one respondent discussed strategies for getting police to respond more quickly by
lying to them about the nature of the crime in progress (Brunson 2007: 82). Further,
Brunson and Weitzer (2009) interviewed white and black teens from three separate
neighborhoods in St. Louis: one predominantly black, one predominantly white and one
mixed neighborhood. Again, both black and white teens reported their perceptions that
police services were better in white neighborhoods and that police in black neighborhoods
would try to rush the handling of a call simply to be finished with it (Brunson and Weitzer
2009: 875-876). The totality of these experiences left the African American teens shaken
in their trust toward police while white teens had a more positive view of police. None of
them trusted the complaint process, which required the teens to go to a police station house
in order to file the complaint. The point being made here is that police performance, while
not the sole determinant, is certainly a component of overall evaluations of trust in police.
As such, police performance is thought to relate positively with trust in police.

Procedural fairness. Tom Tyler’s procedural fairness (justice) policing perspective
argues that procedural fairness predicts trust in police and improves perceptions of police
legitimacy. This occurs because police act in a fair, respectful manner, explaining their
decisions and permitting members of the public to explain their positions: if people witness
these types of interactions or are subject to them, they infer that the organization is itself
procedurally fair, and thus they have trust in it and support its policies vis a vis reporting
crimes and such (Tyler 1990, 2003, 2005; Murphy and Tyler 2017; Hough, Jackson and
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Bradford 2013; Tyler and Fagan 2008). The extent to which an interaction is deemed fair
is based upon individual subjective perceptions of an interaction: there are no universal
standards by which procedural fairness is measured (Tyler 2003). There are essentially two
distinct axes along which individuals evaluate contact with police: quality of interpersonal
treatment and quality of decision-making. Quality of interpersonal treatment involves,
broadly, the extent to which officers treat those they have contact with dignity and respect,
while the quality of decision-making concerns the extent to which officers explain their
decisions, permit opportunities for input in problem-solving and neutrality.
The empirical base for procedural fairness is robust, including studies beyond the
original Anglo-American context to include studies in Ghana, Slovakia, Slovenia, the
Czech Republic and Hungary (Tankebe 2009; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012;
Moravcová 2016). While scholars disagree regarding the convergent and discriminant
validity of the procedural fairness concept itself (Gau 2011), a common finding is that, net
of other influences, including police performance and distributive justice, procedural
fairness is consistently the most important predictor of willingness to cooperate with police.
However, much of the evidence favorable to procedural fairness has only explored the
impact of different types of trust (e.g., trust in procedural fairness, trust in distributive
fairness, etc.) on willingness to comply with the law and cooperate with police and has
used trust as an explanatory variable rather than as an outcome variable (see: Tyler 2005;
Jackson, Hough, Bradford Hohl and Kuha 2012; Hough et al. 2013; Moravcová 2016;
Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton 2017). Among those, only Jackson, et al. (2012), Hough et
al. (2013) and Moravcová (2016) have used ESS Round 5 data. For example, Hough et al.
(2013), who also use the same ESS Round 5 data employed by this article, examine various
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hypotheses related to an “empirical” view of legitimacy versus Bottoms and Tankebe’s
(2012) dialogic view of legitimacy. They use different kinds of trust in police (trust in
police procedural fairness, for example) to see how well those types of trust predict selfreported compliance behaviors in the UK. Hough et al. (2013) demonstrate that trust in
police procedural fairness is the most important predictor of willingness to comply with
the law. Tyler (2005) similarly looked at the predictive power of trust in police for
complying with the law as well as the relationship between police policies and trust in
police. He found that trust in police was significant for complying with the law and that
fairness of procedures was the most important predictor of trust in police.

Universal impartiality. Since the writings of Max Weber, the public administration
and governance literature has had an interest in impartiality and legitimacy. Both Bo
Rothstein and Tom Tyler discuss trust in police and the attainment of political legitimacy.
For Tyler, the answer is simply procedural fairness. Rothstein’s Quality of Government as
impartiality thesis, on the other hand, says that trust in the police and legitimacy of
government – high Quality of Government – comes from exercising public authority in a
universal and impartial way (Rothstein 2005; 2011; Rothstein and Teorell 2008a, 2008b).
Unlike most of the criminal justice contributions, the argument presented in this
paper is lent support for the idea that normative values guiding the use of procedural
fairness from within the discipline by Justice Tankebe (2009; see also: Bottoms and
Tankebe 2012). Tankebe’s (2009) critique of the procedural fairness (Tylerian) perspective
is important for two reasons. First, similar to the position taken by this paper, he argues
that that procedural fairness, police trust and legitimacy are, over and above considerations
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for the “greater good” of increased law-abiding behavior, intrinsically valuable and should
be pursued as such, regardless of the instrumental or utilitarian benefits those concepts may
provide. Tankebe writes: “[t]he police have an intrinsic and non-negotiable obligation to
exercise their authority within the limitations of normative values and expectations of the
particular society in question, irrespective of any demonstrable instrumental benefits in
terms of facilitation of police’s task in maintaining order” (2009: 14). However, while
universal impartiality is here argued to be the normative value by which public authority
is exercised, Tankebe stops short of providing any guidance as to which normative values
are important.
Second, Tankebe argues for the importance of outcomes to individuals, despite the
downplaying of outcomes in subjective assessments of police argued by Tyler. Tankebe
contends that, while fair procedure might be important and mitigate perceptions of
unfavorable outcomes, it cannot nullify the impact of unfair outcomes. People who
regularly receive unfair outcomes are “likely to see the procedure as a sham, orchestrated
to make them feel good when indeed it has no bearing on the outcome” (2009: 14). Without
normative guidance in implementing policy and procedure, Tankebe notes that it is possible
to be led into a “procedural trap” in which “legal and political authorities tend to focus
attention on procedural justice in order to deflect attention away from more substantive
issues” (ibid.). Impartiality in this sense is a guiding normative principle; it helps to avoid
a “mindless utilitarianism” in public policy in which “basic human rights of (often poor)
people are sacrificed in the name of some overall utility” (Rothstein 2011: 6). This is
essentially Rothstein’s critique of the “good governance” approach taken in recent decades
by political philosophy, public administration, criminal justice and financial entities such
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as the World Bank: political legitimacy and trust cannot rest on procedures or the input
side of a political system alone.
Rothstein does not deny that subjective perceptions of procedural fairness are
important to government’s ability to attain political legitimacy. In his discussion of the
events leading up to the Yugoslavian civil war, he makes the following point: Political
legitimacy depends more on the output side of a political system than the input side,
meaning the exercise of public authority is more important than access to input (voting) or
following the “will of the people” for gaining legitimacy. Rothstein continues: “As such,
it [legitimacy] is connected to citizens’ perceptions about procedural fairness in the
implementation of public policies” (2011: 91). What is interesting about these lines is that
Rothstein follows them in the next paragraph by saying “a state that systematically departs
from the ideal of impartiality in implementing public policy will be seen as illegitimate”
(2011: 92). Essentially, Rothstein’s position is that, yes, subjective perceptions of
procedural fairness are important to police and governments for attaining improved
perceptions of legitimacy. But the norm by which individuals will evaluate the “fairness”
of the procedure is by the universal and impartial nature of the implementation of that
policy, not by some parochial concern with fairness as it applies to the individual.
The fact that both Tyler and Rothstein interchange fairness and impartiality
regularly is problematic. Impartiality in the exercise of public authority may to some still
sound very similar to Tyler’s procedural fairness argument, but it is different in two
important ways. First, fairness and impartiality are not synonyms. Universal impartiality is
an absolute: it applies to everyone (universal) and people are either regarded impartially
(that is, reliably and without bias) or they are not; there is no middle ground. Rather,
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impartiality is expected and is the value by which evaluations of fairness are to be made.
Tyler’s fairness, by contrast, deals with subjective perceptions and interpretations and thus
can vary depending upon the individual doing the evaluating. An action may be deemed
fair by an individual yet the act itself not be impartial. An individual may favor aggressive
police tactics against suspects from certain backgrounds but not others and view the use of
these tactics as fair, but such actions would violate the principle of universal impartiality
because those tactics do not apply to everyone, nor is sanction for such bias inscribed in
the law. Fairness is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for impartiality. While it
is possible to say that all which is impartial is fair, it is not possible to state that all that is
fair is impartial.
Second, the procedural aspect of procedural fairness does not seem to apply to the
exercise of public authority but rather to the posture taken by agents of the state when
interacting with the public. “Fair procedure” has less to do with substantive criminal
procedures, such as offering a Miranda warning4, having the effective assistance of counsel
at trial, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, etc. Instead, fair procedure describes
how police should treat individuals and is entirely dependent upon the perceptions of the
subject of those interpersonal “procedures”. Impartiality, by contrast, would be applied to
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The Miranda warning (often shortened to "Miranda", or "Mirandizing" a suspect is the name of the formal
warning that is required to be given by law enforcement in the United States to criminal suspects in police
custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the Miranda ruling. The
purpose of such is to ensure the accused are aware of, and reminded of, these rights before questioning or
actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (U.S. Constitution Article 1 Section 8
Article 5).
Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark case in the United States Supreme Court.
The Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a
defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant
was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against
self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but
voluntarily waived them.
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substantive criminal procedure (all suspects are offered a Miranda warning, all suspects
have the right of effective assistance of counsel at trial, all suspects should receive
reasonable and humane punishments) as well as to the manner in which agents of the state
interact with members of the public (all persons are to be treated with dignity and respect,
all persons deserve to understand what is happening to them). The legitimacy of the state
cannot rest solely on the interactive modality of government agents when they have contact
with members of the public; it must be substantive and apply not only to how the public
are treated but also to how law is implemented and evaluated.
A great example of this come from Jacinta Gau’s (2013) study of the effects of
requests by police for consent searches of cars on driver’s perceptions of stop legitimacy
(see also: Gau and Brunson 2012; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Using
a nationally representative sample of adults and teenagers in the U.S. from the 2008 PolicePublic Contact Survey, Gau (2013) found that consent searches in traffic stops – searches
in which officers requested consent to search a stopped vehicle – in contrast to traffic
violation stops, decreased the trust and legitimacy perceptions of the stop by the driver
despite procedural fairness being employed by the officer (see also: Engel 2005). She
concluded that in consent searches, because pulling the driver over for an alleged traffic
violation was a pretext to get consent to search the car, the consent request indicated to the
driver that the officer was not being impartial. In other words, because the request was
made on the suspicion that they (the drivers) had possibly committed a crime, the impartial
reason (traffic violation) for the stop became partial (pretext to search), and the presence
of procedural fairness in the stop became irrelevant. Gau’s study provides further reason
to suspect that procedural fairness alone is not sufficient to gain the type of broad-based
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trust and legitimacy in police that the Tylerian procedural fairness perspective claims, but
it is consistent with the main argument of this paper, as well as Rothstein’s argument, that
impartiality as a basic norm of the exercise of public authority is an important factor
predicting trust in police.
One final point of difference involves the conceptualization of distributive justice
and universal impartiality. An objection could be raised that Rothstein’s impartiality is
essentially Tyler’s distributive justice. But there is an important way in which these
conceptualizations differ. Impartiality, as a deontological normative value, is not
concerned with subjective perceptions of police service distribution. Rather, impartiality
in the exercise of public authority is an absolute, unqualified rule which should be followed
regardless of fairness considerations as to the distribution of services. A social welfare
program impartially implemented would provide security for all citizens regardless of
wealth, but need is not distributed equally: such a system would provide more services for
those with greater need for those services (Rothstein 2011: 24). Tyler’s distributive justice,
on the other hand, refers to it (distributive justice) as an instrumental motivation for
cooperating with authorities focused on “the fairness of outcomes” (2011: 42; see also
Tyler 2003, 2005) or whether “the police fairly distribute police services, providing ‘equal
protection for all’” (2011: 69). The major difference is that, under Tyler’s conception of
distributive justice, fairness of police service distribution deals with equality of service
while Rothstein’s impartiality holds that police services should be distributed impartially
but with reference to those with greatest need.
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In summary, the idea that the context of a universal, structural impartiality is, in
addition to perceptions of police performance and procedural fairness, an important factor
influencing public trust in and legitimacy for the police is not necessarily a new idea but
one that has not been examined in this way. This essay addresses an often-overlooked
dimension of procedural justice policing using data from the ESS Round 5 ‘trust in justice’
module, namely, what other factors besides performance and procedural fairness influence
trust in police. The next section explains the data and methods for this study.

Data, Model and Variables
Data. Data for this study are taken from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round
5. The ESS is a biennial cross-national survey established in 2001 covering topics ranging
from politics, human values, democracy and health inequalities. The ESS uses crosssectional probability samples representative of all persons at least 15 years of age or older
who live within private households in each country. Since its inception, 37 countries have
participated in at least one round of the ESS.
The current Round 5 of the ESS, conducted in 2010, included a new module
specifically developed for this round entitled Justice. It investigates public trust in criminal
justice with particular emphasis on police and the courts (ESS Round 5 2018). The aim of
this module was to capture individual-level perceptions of trust, legitimacy, cooperation
and compliance, and it did this specifically by asking questions measuring confidence in
the police and the courts, cooperation with the police and courts, contact with police and
attitudes towards punishment (ibid.). There is currently no publicly available data set which
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taps into public attitudes toward police as this one does. As discussed previously, Hough
et al. (2013) have also used this data set to explore the antecedents of police legitimacy,
but whereas Hough et al. (2013) uses only data for the UK, this paper makes use of the
individual-level responses for each country in the dataset. Given that the current study is
interested in exploring factors thought to influence trust in police, the ESS Round 5 is ideal.

Model. The model proposed in this paper is novel in the procedural fairness
literature as it makes individual-level trust in police the outcome variable of interest rather
than as a predictor of legitimacy. The model selected to investigate this question is a
structural equation model (SEM). SEM allows for the analysis of covariances or means in
experimental and non-experimental research designs (Kline 2016). This model has three
distinct advantages over traditional regression models. First, SEM can distinguish between
latent and observed variables, with multiple indicators possible for each latent construct
(Acock 2013; Kline 2016). Concepts such as police performance, procedural justice and
universal impartiality are better modeled as latent constructs than through individual
variables. Second, whereas traditional regression models assume no error in indicators,
SEM isolates measurement error from indicator variables to latent variables, thus granting
stronger predictive power as random measurement error does not have explanatory power
(Acock 2013: 113). Third, a traditional regression model would likely require the
construction of an index or composite variable in order to more accurately model latent
constructs, which potentially introduces more measurement error into the model. Indices
have two major disadvantages compared to latent constructs. First, creating an index,
unlike creating a measurement model, does not permit each response scale to vary freely,
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potentially compounding measurement error. Second, using indices assumes that each
observed variable in the index is weighted equally, whereas measurement models permit
observed variables to make their own relative weights through their coefficients. As a result
of these issues, SEM is a more appropriate choice of model than a traditional regression
for this study.
The full structural equation model can be seen in Figure 1. It consists of a structural
model predicting respondents’ trust in police with three major policy variables and four
controls. The three major policy variables are constructed as measurement models for
police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality. The measurement
model for each composed of three observed variables, which will be discussed below in
greater detail. Four additional control variables thought to potentially influence trust in
police, gender, the log of age and two education levels were included as well.

[FIGURE 1]

Dependent variable. The dependent variable for this study is individual-level trust
in police. The ESS round 5 module ‘Justice’ asked respondents how much they personally
trust the institution of the police using an 11-point scale with higher scores indicating more
trust in police (0 = no trust at all; 10 = complete trust). This variable directly addresses the
main question of this study: whether, in addition to procedural justice policing and police
performance, the basic norm of universal impartiality has an impact on trust in police. The
descriptive statistics for these and all other variables in the analysis are located in Table 1,
below.
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[TABLE 1]

Measurement Models. The primary measurement models in this analysis are latent
constructs for police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality. Each has
been argued to theoretically and/or empirically influence trust in police in the procedural
justice literature.
The first measurement model is police performance. The idea that trust in police is
related to police performance and output effectiveness comes from the traditional crimecontrol and deterrence approach to policing. The crime-control model of policing proposes
that “if the police are successful in fighting crime, they [the police] encourage public trust
and confidence and generally gain the help and support of the public for the police” (Tyler
2005: 325). In other words, the better the public perception that police are controlling and
preventing crime, the more public trust they receive (Kelling and Coles 1996; Wilson and
Kelling 1982). The ESS Round 5 contains three variables that gauge the extent to which
the public view their police as effective in preventing and controlling crime: How quickly
police arrive at a violent crime scene near to where respondent lives (police responsiveness:
0 = extremely slowly; 10 = extremely quickly), how successful police are at preventing
crimes in country (violent crime prevention: 0 = extremely unsuccessful; 1 = extremely
successful) and how successful police are at catching house burglars in country (burglary
prevention: 0 = extremely unsuccessful; 1 = extremely successful). Each of these variables
is hypothesized to relate positively to police performance.
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The second measurement model is procedural fairness. Tyler’s procedural fairness
argument is that people who perceive police to have treated them fairly and with respect in
their dealings will be more likely to trust police and to infer the trustworthiness of other
police officers (2005; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Lind 1992). In other words,
perceptions of procedural fairness are antecedents of trust in police. There are two key
aspects to citizen evaluations: quality of interpersonal treatment, which includes process
transparency and respective the dignity and acknowledging the rights, and quality of
decision-making, which includes police explaining their decisions (understandable actions)
and the perceived fairness of the process (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003, 2005).
The principles of quality of treatment, decision-making and understandable actions are
captured by survey variables asking respondents how often police make fair, impartial
decisions in the cases they deal with (fair treatment: 1 = not at all; 4 = very often), how
often police treat people in their country with respect (respect citizens: 1 = not at all often;
4 = very often) and how often police explain decisions when asked (explain decisions: 1 =
not at all often; 4 = very often). Each of these variables is hypothesized to relate positively
to procedural justice.
The third and final latent construct is universal impartiality. Rothstein’s
impartiality is concerned with universal application, regardless of socio-economic status
or racial/ethnic or gender identity, victim or offender status, an absence of corruption (be
it police, court or other administrative apparatus) and the absence of undue political
pressure on police by politicians or public opinion. Universal impartiality should relate
positively to trust in police. Three questions created using variables from the ESS Round
5 capture these points succinctly. The first item was created from a question which asked
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respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which rich and poor victims are treated the same.
The second response (rich and poor are treated equally) is the basis for the creation of
(treat wealth equal: 0 = no; 1 = yes). The third item (incorruptible) was created from the
never category of variable (plccbrb) asking how often police in the respondent’s country
never take bribes (incorruptible: 0 = no; 1 = yes). The third and final item (political
pressure) was created from the disagree strongly category of variable (plciplt) which asked
the extent to which a country’s police are unduly influenced by politicians or political
pressure (political pressure: 0 = no; 1 = yes). Each item is hypothesized to relate positively
to impartiality.
An question which asked respondents whether police in their country treat cases
they deal with fairly and impartially (fair treatment: 1 = not at all; 4 = very often) was
considered and rejected as a predictor of impartiality because, as has been previously
discussed, fairness and impartiality are not synonyms, despite them being used
interchangeably by both Rothstein and Tyler. Impartiality as a universal idea is categorical
and cannot, by definition, be a matter of degrees, while the fair treatment variable is a
measure of degree and is not categorical. Because it is a measure of degree rather than an
absolute, it is likely that fair treatment was understood by respondents as referring to
fairness rathe than impartiality. Thus, while fair treatment may not fit well into the
impartiality measurement model, it does do well to capture the subjective and graduated
fairness dimension of the procedural fairness policing measurement model.
Control Variables. Four variables were added to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the population. These include an item for gender (Female: 0 = Male; 1 =
Female), education level, divided into individuals with less than the secondary level of
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education (Less Than HS: 0 = No; 1 = Yes) and those with a tertiary education or higher
(Academic Degree: 0 = No; 1 = Yes). An age variable (lnage) was also included and logged.
The theory presented in this paper does not provide guidance for the impact of these control
variables on trust in police, but it is expected that female, age and higher levels of education
relate positively with trust in police while lower levels of education relates negatively with
trust in police. This is because females are more likely to be victimized and less likely to
be offenders and therefore have a more trusting view of police. Age and education follow
similar paths: adolescents are more likely to have run-ins with law enforcement while as
people age, they tend to support and trust the police more; and, as educational attainment
increases, so too does support for the role of legal institutions in maintaining public order.
[FIGURE 1]

Results and Discussion

The main finding of the structural model of this study – that universal impartiality
is an important predictor of trust in police alongside police performance and procedural
fairness policing – is empirically supported. In Model 1, the effects of police performance,
procedural fairness and impartiality were analyzed as well as several control variables such
as age (logged), gender and education level to assess the joint impact of all three constructs
simultaneously on trust in police. As can be seen in Table 2, in the structural models, the
main policy variable for this study, universal impartiality, as well as procedural fairness
and police performance were all highly significant predictors of trust in police; that is,
when people perceive police as being non-discriminatory, uncorrupted and free of undue
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political influence, in addition to perceived fair and respectful police treatment, they are
more likely to trust the police. This is consistent with previous research which has found
that procedural justice is an antecedent to trust in police. However, unlike previous models
of procedural justice, police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality
are predictors of trust in police, not of perceptions of legitimacy. Among the control
variables, only education at the bachelor’s level or above was a significant predictor. The
measurement model, seen in Table 3, indicates that all observed variables have the correct
sign and significance in relation to their latent constructs.

[TABLE 3]

Model fit statistics indicate a good model fit. There are a plethora of model fit
indices available, but at a minimum analysts tend to report the comparative fit index (CFI),
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI, also Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)), and the root mean squared
error of approximation (RMSEA) (Schreiber, Stage, King, Nora and Barlow 2006). The
CFI adjusts issues with sample size found in several fit tests (i.e., chi-square, normed fit)
and measures the discrepancy between the data and the hypothesized model (Gatignon
2011; Hu and Bentler 1999). A model is considered to have a “good” fit if the CFI is greater
than or equal to 0.95. The CFI for both models is 0.983 and 0.973, respectively, indicating
that this model is a good fit. The TLI compares the chi-squared value of the null model to
the chi-squared test of the hypothesized model, correcting for negative bias. A TLI value
greater than or equal to 0.95 is considered a good model fit. The TLI for both models 0.977
and 0.965, respectively. Finally, the RMSEA measures the discrepancy between the
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population covariance matrix and the hypothesized model (with optimally chosen
parameters) (Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen 2008). RMSEAs less than 0.8 indicate a good
fit; the RMSEA for both models is 0.027. The overall R-squared for Model 1 is 0.97.
Several robustness checks were performed on the data to confirm the results. The
first robustness check was to estimate the model using maximum likelihood (ML), quasimaximum likelihood (QML), maximum likelihood missing values (MLMV) and
asymptotic distribution free (ADF). The maximum likelihood family of estimators is
sensitive to multivariate non-normality, but can be relaxed, provided the analyst recognizes
that the standard error of the variance could be large. The result of running the main model
with each estimator was that signs and significance for regression coefficients remained
comparable, indicating that the findings reported here are robust. The estimator reported
for this SEM model is a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator. Other estimator methods
have certain advantages, for example, asymptotic distribution free (ADF) and quasimaximum likelihood (QML or robust ML) deal with issues of heteroskedasticity, while
maximum likelihood missing values (MLMV) can produce reliable estimates in the face of
missing data. Approximately 36% of the observations in this model were missing on the
dependent variable (trust in police). However, after testing each estimator separately on
the main model, the same signs and significance for each measurement model were noted,
indicating that the ML estimator was sufficient.
The second robustness check was performed by dividing up the data into three
different groups with different sets of institutions: former socialist, Protestant and nonProtestant countries. Model 2 samples former socialist-bloc countries: Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and
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Hungary. Model 3 looks only at majority Protestant countries: Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. Model 4 samples
majority non-Protestant countries: France, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland, Israel
and Belgium. This check was to ensure that the results were not driven by specific
institutional traditions. Models 2 through 4, which tested the main hypothesis across a
subsample of former socialist, current Protestant and non-Protestant countries for
robustness, found that universal impartiality and procedural fairness remained highly
significant predictors of trust in police. Consistent with previous research, police
performance was also found to be significant predictor of trust in police; that is, when
people perceived the police as being successful and competent at controlling crime, they
were more likely to trust the police. As can be seen in Table 2, the signs and significance
of the impact of the measurement models on trust in police are analogous, meaning that no
one country or set of countries nor institutional arrangements drive the significant result in
Model 1. However, in the subsamples the effect of universal impartiality and procedural
fairness were diminished somewhat while police performance became more prominent.
This diminution may suggest that both universal impartiality and procedural fairness are
incorporated in perceptions of police performance, meaning that they may not be an
“either/or” but instead a “both/and”. This check also shows that impartiality, at least within
the European context, is universal: it is a positive and highly significant indicator for trust
in police across national and institutional contexts, even though the significance of both
impartiality and procedural fairness diminishes across models.
The findings presented in this study are important for criminal justice thinking and
policy. The first implication is that while the search for police trust and legitimacy certainly
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has a performance and procedural aspect, the normative context in which performance and
procedure are deployed matters to individuals when making the decision to trust in police.
In so doing, procedural fairness and impartiality are cast in a new light: police and legal
authorities can deploy them and probably net “good” (read: providing self-regarding
benefits) outcomes, but this is not the reason why they should be used. Instead, the fact that
the ESS Round 5 captures these subjective perceptions is important because it indicates
what individuals are looking for in their social contract. Impartiality is not an essential
universal truth discovered through these models, but rather it is a social preference for a
universal rule that people would like to have written into their social contracts in these
societies, at least in the European context. Although the United States was not included in
this dataset, the fact that Western European countries in the liberal tradition support
impartiality suggests that the U.S., which also prizes classical liberalism, might, too. It is
thus worth considering how the police procedures and tactics would be articulated under
the rubric of universal impartiality.

Conclusion
The findings reported in this study support the idea that the normative value of
universal impartiality is an important contextual component for understanding public trust
in police.
The value of this paper is that it connects and builds upon Tyler’s and Rothstein’s
theoretical and empirical work on procedural fairness and Quality of Government. Tyler’s
procedural fairness takes a normative consequentialist position on legitimacy. The Tylerian
position holds that procedural fairness is an antecedent to trust in police and that trust in
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police can lead to an increase in perceived legitimacy for the police and compliance and
cooperation with the law. However, Tyler’s fairness is subjective, based upon individual
perceptions, and not universal, which means that the procedural justice perspective leaves
open the question of what the substantive content of laws ought to be and which laws ought
to be followed to political philosophy (Tyler 2003).
Rothstein’s approach, by contrast, is universal and deontological. The Rothsteinian
perspective on Quality of Government is that public authority should be exercised
impartially and in a procedurally fair manner. However, for Rothstein, procedural fairness
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for impartiality because without an overarching
value to guide the creation and implementation of public policy it is entirely possible that
biased laws could be created and administered in a procedurally fair manner (Tankebe
2007; Gau 2013; Rothstein 2011) that would not be impartial. Rothstein, therefore, shifts
further than Tyler, arguing that the normative context in which procedural fairness is
employed is an important factor predicting not only trust in police but trust and legitimacy
in government as well. However, Rothstein uses the terms fairness and impartiality
interchangeably, which complicates efforts to disentangle conceptually whether he means
subjective fairness or universal impartiality.
In considering the findings presented in this study, it is important to recognize three
substantial limitations. The first issue is that data presented here are cross-sectional,
limiting the scope for inferring causal relationships. Ideal data regarding police
performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality would be a longitudinal panel
to better analyze their impact on perceptions over time. Perceptions of impartiality are not
likely to change in the short term because of a new, more partial political and policing
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regime. A society whose public expect universal impartiality will not throw that norm away
even if the entire government behaves partially toward groups in society. However, the
same cannot be readily said of procedural justice policing or police performance,
particularly in places where universal impartiality is perceived to be low. Having data
measured at regular intervals might help disentangle, for example, whether there is a
causative relationship between police performance, procedural fairness and universal
impartiality or whether past events – such as an historical trend of corruption in a country
(collective memory), for example – creates multiple equilibria and leads to path dependent
outcomes (Rothstein 2005; Charon and LaPuente 2011).
The second limitation is that it could be the case that individuals have a difficult
time separating between procedural fairness and impartiality, creating a data measurement
limitation. Indeed, fairness and impartiality are not equivalent concepts despite sharing
some scope and reach in common. Even though the ESS Round 5 data set provides access
to an array of individual perceptions regarding the police and the courts that is unsurpassed
in its richness, questions such as that for fair treatment (“In the cases they deal with, do
police treat victims in a fair and impartial manner?”) conflate the two concepts, making
them analytically difficult to parse out, and thus having an impact on the level of certainty
that can be carried by the conclusions presented here. The final issue is that, to date, a data
set does not exist to test the main hypothesis of this paper within the American context.
While the argument has been made above that Americans would follow their Western
European counterparts in upholding the norm of impartiality, such a discussion is
speculative at best. Future research on police performance, procedural fairness and
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universal impartiality should focus on additional countries not included in the current
analysis.
In conclusion, the main argument of this paper has been that universal impartiality,
in addition to procedural fairness and police performance, is a significant predictor for trust
in police. The empirical analysis supported this hypothesis. The significance of this paper
is that it puts into conversation two scholars whose work has previously not been
conversant with one another to present a model of trust in police that deepens the
conceptual nuance of this most important issue.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of model variables
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Trust in police

Min
0

Max
10

Mean
5.666

Std.
Deviation
2.688

female
ln(age)
lessthanhs
bachorbet

Gender (female)
Natural log of age in years
Less than secondary education
Greater than or equal bachelor’s degree

0
2.639
0
0

1
4.615
1
1

0.512
3.758
0.279
0.214

0.499
0.432
0.449
0.411

Impartiality
politicalpress
treatwealth
incorruptible

Are police unduly influenced by political pressure?
Do police treat rich and poor victims of crimes equally?
Police do not take bribes

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.189
0.474
0.080

0.391
0.499
0.272

Procedural Justice
treatfair
explaindecision
respectcitizen

Do police treat cases fairly and impartially?
Do police explain decisions?
Do police treat people with respect?

1
0
1

4
4
4

2.732
2.499
2.781

0.672
0.857
0.702

How well do police prevent violent crime?
How well do police prevent burglary?
How quickly do police respond to violent crime in your
area?

0
0

10
10

5.109
4.675

2.048
2.173

0

10

5.645

2.287

Variable Name
trustpolice

Police Performance
preventviolcrime
preventburgl
responsiveness

Description

N=33,779
Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010)

Figure 3.1. – Impact of police performance, procedural justice and universal impartiality on police trust
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Table 3.2: Structural model estimating the impact of police performance, procedural fairness and impartiality on police trust
Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

All Data

Former Socialist

Protestant

Non-Protestant

N

33,779

11,426

11,585

10,182

Partial R2

0.475

0.396

0.407

0.443

0.317***
(0.015)
0.240***
(0.012)
0.229***
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.038***
(0.004)

0.281***
(0.027)
0.151***
(0.021)
0.283***
(0.015)
0.011
(0.008)
-0.038***
(0.008)
0.010
(0.008)
0.032***
(0.008)

0.227***
(0.026)
0.230***
(0.018)
0.297***
(0.015)
0.007
(0.007)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.039***
(0.008)
0.060***
(0.008)

0.188***
(0.024)
0.256***
(0.018)
0.315***
(0.015)
0.018**
(0.008)
0.013
(0.008)
-0.025**
(0.009)
0.011
(0.008)

Impartiality
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Procedural Justice
Police Performance
female
(ln)age
lessthanhs
bachorbet

***p<0.01 **p < 0.05 *p<0.1

Table 3.3: Measurement models and model fit for Model (1)
N

33,779

Adjusted R2

0.970

RMSEA

0.035

CFI

0.973

TLI

0.965

SRMR

0.026

Coefficien
t
Std. Dev.
Impartiality
politicalpress
treatwealth
incorruptible

0.261***
0.591***
0.310***

0.007
0.007
0.006

Procedural Justice
policefairimp
policeexplaindec
policerespect

0.804***
0.618***
0.800***

0.003
0.004
0.003

Police Performance
preventviolcrime
preventburgl
policeresponse

0.840***
0.772***
0.613***

0.003
0.003
0.004

***p<0.01 **p < 0.05 *p<0.1
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CHAPTER IV
TRUST IN POLICE: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS AND
PATH DEPENDENCY

Introduction
An important consideration in accounting for variations in trust in police is the role
of social network effects and collective memory. Contemporary methods of increasing
perceptions of trust and legitimacy toward police, like community policing and procedural
fairness, look at the decision to trust police as most directly influenced by present positive
police-public social interactions from which individuals infer the trustworthiness and
legitimacy of police institutions. The community policing philosophy, for example, looks
to the frequency of police-public contacts and the level of citizen involvement in problemsolving as the main methods for gaining public trust in police (Trojanowicz, Kappeler,
Gaines and Bucqueroux 1998; Greene 2000; Gill, et al. 2014). The procedural fairness
position holds that the quality of treatment in interpersonal contact is the mechanism by
which individual perceptions of police trust are increased, leading transitively to
heightened perceptions of institutional trustworthiness and legitimacy (Tyler 1990, 2003,
2005; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). The empirical record for community policing and
procedural fairness seem to support these claims, yet variation remains in individual-level
perceptions of trust in police (e.g., Tankebe 2009b; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012;
Moravcová 2016; Gill, et al. 2014).
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In addition to concerns about the quality and frequency of police-public contact,
another important factor influencing trust in police is that individual decisions to trust are
influenced by the behavior of family members, friends and neighbors whose accumulated
experiences and perceptions of police are collectively shared and passed along to
subsequent generations, potentially leading to a path dependency for trust in police from
which reversing course may be impossible. The implications of the existence of a social
network effect for trust in police means taking seriously the impacts of previous contact
with police represented through peer group influence and collective memories on
individual behavior. It may not be sufficient, for example, for a single procedurally fair
police-public interaction to overcome the collective memory of current peer group and past
police antagonism influence to change individual perceptions of police trustworthiness and
legitimacy.
Thus, the main question for this paper is whether a social network effect for trust
in police exists. If it does, it is further argued that collective memory is one consequence
of social network effects. Combining the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the U.S.
Decennial Census, the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics series
and the F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report data, this paper aims to explore the impact of social
network effects on trust in police. The value of this paper is threefold. First, it empirically
and quantitatively tests for the existence of a social network effect for trust in police which,
as of the date of writing, has not been studied previously in the criminal justice literature.
Second, it brings together the concepts of social network effects and collective memory in
the context of police trust. Third, it makes relevant for criminal justice the theory of
collective memory, underscoring the importance of an individual’s historical mental maps
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and his/her contemporary attitudes, beliefs and behaviors which is germane to
understanding the difficulty inherent in changing perceptions of police trustworthiness
incrementally.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The first part presents a review of
literature linking social network effects to trust in police. The second section describes the
methods and data to be utilized in the analysis. Section three presents and interprets the
results of the analysis while section four engages in an extended policy discussion of the
implications of this paper for policy and thinking about generating trust in police. The
conclusion discusses some of the limitations of the present study.

Social Network Effects
Social network effects. Known variously as peer effects, social spillover effects,
neighborhood effects, herd behavior and peer pressure, social network effects are defined
as “the propensity of an individual to behave in some way with the prevalence of that
behaviour in some reference group containing the individual” (Manski 1993: 531; see also:
Brock and Durlauf 2001, 2002; Manski 2000). Put another way, a social network effect
exists if individuals are influenced in their attitudes or behaviors by the aggregate attitudes
or behaviors of their social reference group. Why might an individual might adopt the
attitudes and behaviors of their peer reference group? The reason for adoption falls roughly
into two categories. The first category is based on an individual having an underlying
preference for conformity and find disutility in being the only person who thinks or behaves
a certain way. The second category views the adoption of a modality (e.g., trusting police)
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by others as a type of information signal: if other people in my reference group trust police,
they must have information about the police that I do not.
The existence of a social network effect for trust in police is important for two
reasons. First, it would mean that an individual’s inclination to trust police would be
influenced by the individual’s reference group’s aggregate-level behavior of trusting
police. Thus, an individual who might otherwise be inclined to trust police may adopt a
non-trusting posture toward them if his/her neighbors, family members and friends do not
trust police. Previous research on endogenous social network effects has shown how
individual-level decisions are influenced by aggregate-level group attitudes and behaviors;
examples of the positive impact of endogenous social network effects on individual-level
decisions can be found across a wide variety of social phenomena. In the fields of clinical
and public health, it has been argued that network effects are germane to the behavioral
trait of obesity and that obesity appears to spread through social ties (e.g., Christakis and
Fowler 2007; Fowler and Christakis 2008a, 2008b). In transportation economics, scholars
have found an endogenous social network effect for transportation mode choice (i.e.,
walking, taking transit, driving, car-pooling, etc.) and automobile ownership (e.g., Goetzke
2006; Goetzke and Weinberger 2012), indicating that individual mode choice is influenced
by aggregate tract-level mode choice. And in marketing, research has shown that
individuals have a higher probability of product or service adoption if they are connected
to many other adopters (e.g., Katona, Zubczsek and Sarvary 2010; Trusov, Bucklin and
Pauwels 2009). It is therefore not a stretch to suggest that a social network effect for police
trust exists.
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Second, the existence of social network effects implies multiple equilibria, meaning
that the aggregate outcome may be path dependent. Path dependency is a selfreinforcement mechanism: each step along a given path increases the returns for and
likelihood of continuing along that same path, while switching from that course to a
previously viable alternative option cannot be accomplished without incurring significant
costs (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000). Social processes, like economic processes, may not
move steadily toward an efficient equilibrium but instead the character of the equilibrium
depends, at least in part, on the starting point and the process of getting there (Liebowitz
and Margolis 2000). Path dependent processes will therefore not necessarily converge
toward an optimal equilibrium but rather reach one of several equilibria, and “[t]here is no
guarantee that the particular outcome selected from among the many alternatives will be
the ‘best’ one” (Arthur 1994: 1). Thus, if a critical share of members within a reference
group adopt that same modality (e.g., trusting police), the probability of another individual
connected to that reference group adopting the same modality increases, while the
probability of making the opposite choice (not trusting police) is significantly diminished.
In other words, historical events can have durable, persistent effects on present behaviors
that may be difficult to reverse.
The study of social network effects is not foreign to the criminal justice literature,
but there is an important distinction between an endogenous social network effect and the
contextual or “neighborhood effects” used in the criminal justice literature. The term
“neighborhood effects” is used to describe the impact of two concepts: concentrated
disadvantage and collective efficacy. Concentrated disadvantage refers to the one-way
impact of the structural (ecological) characteristics of place on life outcomes, such as the
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effect of concentrated poverty on child and adolescent development or the impact of shared
perceptions of disorder on later poverty (Wilson 2012; Sampson 2012). Concentrated
disadvantage is typically modeled using measures aggregated to the spatial unit of analysis
(i.e., place-level, tract-level, block-level, etc.) and suggests that these contextual variables
have a one-way impact on individual-level outcome variables.
The term “collective efficacy” on the other hand is used to refer to group-level
norms of trust and reciprocity that influence individual behavior among spatially
contiguous residents (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012, 2013;
Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). Scholars have used collective efficacy to
explain a variety of social phenomena, including disparities in crime rates across
neighborhoods and communities: Where collective efficacy is high, levels of crime and
violence are low and where collective efficacy is low, levels of crime and violence are high
(Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson 2012,
2013). The implication is that aggregate neighborhood social trust (collective efficacy) and
shared perceptions of social disorder shape individual decisions to intervene on behalf of
the neighborhood as an agent of social control, which is similar to the workings of a social
network effect. However, collective efficacy is not modeled as an endogenous social
network effect but rather as an individual-level perception of neighborhood- or communitylevels of collective efficacy.
However, the discussion of social network effects presented in this paper and the
literature on neighborhood effects in criminal justice differ an important way. Concentrated
disadvantage might more accurately be described as a contextual effect rather than an
endogenous social network effect. Contextual effects are one-way social interaction of
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attitudes or behaviors from the group-level to the individual-level that vary with group
characteristics (i.e., socioeconomic characteristics of the community population), whereas
endogenous social network effects are bi-directional spillovers in which the attitudes or
behaviors of the reference group affects the attitudes or behaviors of the individual (Manski
1993, 2000; Goetzke and Weinberger 2012). The contextual effect of socioeconomic status
is unidirectional and varies along with the socioeconomic conditions and built environment
characteristics in which residents find themselves: child and adolescent development,
crime and violence are impacted by socioeconomic status, but socioeconomic status is not
impacted by child or adolescent development, crime or violence. A truly endogenous social
network effect would run both ways, as could be argued is the case for collective efficacy:
individual-level decisions to intervene on behalf of neighborhood kids aggregates to the
community level of collective efficacy while community-level collective efficacy
influences individual-level decisions to intervene. This paper is concerned with analyzing
the influence of endogenous social network effects on trust in police rather than the effects
of neighborhood contextual effects on resident attitudes.
One way to conceptualize this difference between the two kinds of effects is that
contextual effects vary by group characteristic, so contextual effects will vary with
socioeconomic status, educational attainment, ethnicity, age, etc. This influence is only in
one direction: group characteristics influence individual behavior, but individual behavior
does not influence group characteristics (e.g., an individual attempting to increase his or
her educational attainment does not mean that categories of educational attainment
change). Endogenous social network effect varies with the prevalence of an attitude or
behavior within a social reference group. That group may be made up of individuals with
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various characteristics or even who live in spatially discontinuous areas. These effects are
bi-directional; that is, as a behavior becomes prevalent amongst a critical share of that
group, that group behavior influences the individual’s behavior, but at the same time, the
individual’s behavior aggregates or makes up part of the group level behavior, indicating
a reflection problem.

Data, Model and Variables

To examine whether a social network effect for trust in police exists, this paper
draws from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (Saguaro Seminar 2000), the 2000
F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report (Kaplan 2019), the Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics Series (U.S. Department of Justice 2000) and the U.S. Decennial
Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) databases. All data sets have the base year of 2000.

Data. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey aims to provide a standardized
measurement of social capital across American communities which can be used to gauge
variations in social capital in the future. To date, this survey remains one of the richest
sources of social capital data in the United States. The survey, conducted via telephone
interview from February to July 1999, consists of over 29,000 observations from 40
communities in the United States providing data which assesses individual-level
perceptions and attitudes toward civic and social interactions. The restricted use version of
the data set provides geocoding which enables matching of individual-level responses to
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geographical places and adds a spatial dimension to the analysis of social capital. The
survey is relevant to the current study because it contains the outcome variable (trust in
local police), the main social network effect policy variable (police trust network) which
can easily be derived from the outcome variable as well as the individual-level
sociodemographic characteristics used as controls. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey
has been used in the past to measure trust in police. For example, MacDonald and Stokes
(2006) use trust in police as an outcome variable in their examination of whether
community-level social processes related to social capital explain racial and community
variations in the trust of police, but whereas they were interested in the role social capital
plays in influencing trust in police at the individual-level, this paper is interested in the
impact of an aggregate-level endogenous social network effect on individual-level trust in
police. Sharp and Johnson (2009) test a variety of explanations for variation in distrust of
local police in the U.S. using a derivation of the trust in police variable. However, their
model uses contextual effects as a control for variation in the dependent variable due to
unobserved heterogeneity in the city rather than taking as their main policy variable the
endogenous social network effect for trust in police.
The 2000 U.S. Decennial Census provides a rich source of aggregate sociodemographic data and structural variables geocoded to the place-levels which permits
merging with the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and the other data sources for the
analysis which will be discussed. Decennial Census data has been combined with the Social
Capital Benchmark survey in previous research to explore the impact of social capital on
homicide rates (e.g., Rosenfeld, Baumer and Messner 2001; Messner, Baumer and
Rosenfeld 2004), spatial and individual determinants of a variety of outcomes including
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happiness, quality of life, newspaper readership (Williamson 2010) and social capital and
segregated public schools (Jones-Sanpei 2009).
The F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report has served as a nationwide periodic assessment
of reported crimes not available elsewhere in the criminal justice system since 1930. The
2000 Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest data files, collect monthly data on the
number of Index Crime offenses reported and the number of offenses cleared by arrest or
other means. The counts include all reports of Index Crimes (excluding arson) received
from victims, officers who discovered infractions, or other sources. Uniform Crime Report
data can be merged by originating agency identifier to the Law Enforcement Agency
Crosswalk Identifier which facilitates the matching of aggregate levels of crime to the
place-level geographic areas.
The Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics series is a
periodic survey of law enforcement agency resources, personnel and responsibilities from
law enforcement agencies at the state, county and municipal levels. Agencies reported in
this series can be matched to specific place-level geographic locations using the Law
Enforcement Agency Identifier Crosswalk data file.

Model. The model used for this paper is a two-stage instrumental variable probit
(TSIVP) model to estimate an individual’s decision to trust police or not as well as to
account for endogeneity in the analysis. This method calls for a first step OLS regression
with the endogenous effect as the dependent variable on the instrumental variables. The
residuals of the first step and the measured endogenous effect are used in the second-step
binary choice probit model (Woolridge 2015). An instrumental variable approach is
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appropriate when analyzing social network effects. By the definition discussed earlier,
social network effects are endogenous because they influence the dependent variable while
being themselves influenced by the dependent variable. This scenario is called the
reflection problem (Manski 1993; 2000) and it confounds analysis using linear approaches
like the ordinary least squares model because that model cannot disentangle individuallevel effects from contextual, endogenous or correlated effects. However, it is possible to
use probit or logit models (e.g., two-stage instrumental variable probit, two-stage
instrumental variable ordered probit), as described by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002)
because these models are non-linear, which means that endogenous, contextual and
correlated effects do not depend on one another as they do in linear approaches and thus
their effects can be isolated for analysis. In this case the main policy variable, the
aggregate-level police trust network, is endogenous to individual-level trust in police. In
other words, both variables suffer from the reflection/simultaneity problem: aggregatelevel network trust influences individual-level trust, which in turn is a component of
aggregate-level network trust. In order to disentangle the individual- from the aggregatelevel effect, it will be necessary to select valid instruments which affect the dependent
variable through the endogenous explanatory variable, but which are exogenous to the
outcome variable. Two instruments were selected and a discussion of them follows later.

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable for this study is individual-level trust
in police. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey asked respondents how much they
personally trust the institution of the police using a 4-point scale with higher scores
indicating more trust in police (0 = not at all; 1= a little; 2= some; 3= a lot). Although this
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variable measures trust by degrees, for the purposes of this study it was unclear what
magnitude difference exists between “a little” trust and “some” trust. For this reason
several specifications of the dependent variable were explored, ultimately leading to the
creation of a dichotomous variable combining the top and bottom two categories so as to
model a clear bifurcation of individual-level trust in police (0 = not at all and a little; 1 =
some and a lot). The mean for individual-level trust in police is 0.808 which is very similar
to the mean for the aggregate-level trust in police network effect which is 0.803. Merging
the data sets together resulted in a reduction of the total N for the data set. Many of the
observations from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey did not have place-level identifiers
and so were excluded a priori, while data was not available for all police departments or
for all months of the year in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics which contributed to another drop in observations, leaving the total N for the
model at 6,347. Because the loss of observations was largely due to combining data sets,
the randomness of the sample is preserved. A list of variables, their sources and descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 1, below.

[TABLE 1]

Explanatory variables. The main explanatory variable for this study is the placelevel social network effect for trust in police which was created using the individual-level
trust in police measure from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Equation (1) below
shows the procedure for creating the network effect variable. This variable was created by
aggregating individual-level trust in police to the place-level, subtracting the individual
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from the aggregate and dividing the aggregate by the remaining number of residents at that
place. As discussed in the section on social network effects, the resulting variable is an
endogenous effect given its simultaneity; that is, the behavior of the individual is affected
by the behavior of the peer group while the behavior of the peer group is also the aggregate
of individual behavior. In this model the endogenous effects are addressed through an
instrumental variable approach. A positive sign would signify the presence of a social
network effect.

(Place-level aggregate trust in police – Individual-level trust in police)
(# of respondents at place-level – individual respondent)

(1)

Instruments. The challenge to using an instrumental variable approach is to find
valid instruments which are only correlated to the endogenous explanatory variable that
are not also correlated with the dependent variable. A valid instrument for this model
should have an exogenous impact on the social network variable (aggregate-level of trust
in police) but not have a direct effect on the individuals’ trust in police. Two instruments
were selected which are theoretically and empirically appropriate instruments. The first is
the place-level median household income for 1999 taken from the U.S. Decennial Census
2000; the second is the violent crime rate per capita for 1968 taken from the F.B.I.’s
Uniform Crime Report 1968. The rationale for choosing these instruments is that they are
not directly correlated with the dependent variable but are correlated with the endogenous
social network effect. Place-level median household income was chosen because it is
exogenous and not correlated directly with individual-level trust in police: median income
can influence aggregate trust in police in that higher median incomes are indicative of
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greater aggregate trust in police but individual trust in police does not influence place-level
median income. Violent crime per capita for 1968 are also exogenous and, due to its
temporal distance from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000, is unlikely to be
correlated with individual-level trust in police. Place-level median income is expected to
relate positively with the endogenous social network effect while violent crime in 1968
should be relate negatively to it.

Controls. Twelve control variables were added to account for variations in the
outcome (trust in police) stemming from unobserved heterogeneity in the population. The
first nine are comprised of respondent-level socio-demographic characteristics and are
taken from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000. These include an item indicating
whether the respondent is male, black, Hispanic, currently rents his/her residence,
respondent’s age category, respondent’s income level, whether the respondent is
unemployed and whether the respondent has an educational attainment below the high
school level. The last three control for place-level characteristics relevant for criminal
justice analysis, including the number of full-time sworn officers with arrest powers per
capita and community police officers as a percentage of full-time sworn officers with arrest
powers. Both variables were drawn from the Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics 2000 data set. The final variable, violent crime per capita for
2000, was drawn from the F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report 2000.
The theory presented in this paper does not offer specific guidance as to the
expected signs for the control variables, but previous research has consistently indicated
that trust in police tends to be lower for males, Blacks, Hispanics, renters, young people,

85

the unemployed and those with lower educational attainment (see: Sampson 2012; Brunson
2007; Brunson and Miller 2006; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; Weitzer and Tuch
1999). Further, current numbers of regular police, community policing officers and violent
crimes may also influence trust in police. The broken windows theory of crime control
posits that community members would feel safer because of increased police presence
(Wilson and Kelling 1982); the community policing philosophy was designed with the
intention of building trust between police and minority communities (Trojanowicz 1986).
Yet, the presence of additional community policing or regular officers could be interpreted
by residents as a signal of relative security/insecurity, not to mention that trusting police is
often a function of race and characteristics of the built environment. Further, current levels
of violent crime can be interpreted that police are either very good at their jobs (crime
control and deterrence) or very bad at it, meaning levels of trust in police might be
influenced either way here as well.

Results

Using

the

instrumental

variable

approach,

the

instruments

pass

the

overidentification, weak instruments and exogeneity tests. The overidentification test
evaluates the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, or,
to put it another way, that they are uncorrelated with the outcome variable and correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. A failure to reject the null hypothesis would bring
into question the validity of those instruments; as can be seen in Table 2, the tests failed to
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reject the null hypothesis, indicating that these are in fact valid instruments correctly
excluded. The weak instrument test evaluates empirically whether the selected instruments
are relevant to the endogenous variable. The test has as its null hypothesis that selected
instruments are weak if they fail to pass a critical threshold. The critical value for weak
instruments was exceeded, suggesting these instruments are relevant. The Wald exogeneity
test evaluates whether an excluded endogenous variable is actually exogenous. The social
network effect fails to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald exogeneity test, suggesting
that the instrumented variable is exogenous. However, it is still expected from the
perspective of theory that the social network effect for trust in police is endogenous
regardless of the test. Therefore, two models are presented here which confirm the social
network effect. Model 1 displays the first and second stage of the instrumental variable
probit model with a binary dependent variable for trust in police while Model 2 shows the
first and second stage of an ordered probit model with an ordinal dependent variable for
trust in police. If both models are significant, it gives confidence that the social network
effect indeed exists.

[TABLE 2]

As can be seen in Table 3, the main finding of Model 1 suggests that there is a
social network effect for trust in police. That is the significant positive coefficient on the
social network effect implies that individuals are influenced in their decision to trust police
by the trust placed in police of those around them. Model 2’s results, which can be seen in
Table 4, mirror those of Model 1 in the sign and significance of the presence of a social
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network effect. The fact that both Models 1 and 2 show the social network effect to be
significant adds a level of confidence to the results presented here. In the first stage in both
models the instruments are significant for the social network effect; that is, violent crime
per capita in 1968 is negative and significant for the social network effect while place-level
median income is positive and significant for the effect.
Several of the control variables had the correct signs and significance as predictors
of individual-level trust in police, consistent with prior research (e.g., Weitzer and Tuch
1999; MacDonald and Stokes 2006; Sharp and Johnson 2009). Male, black and Hispanic
are significant and negative for trust in police, as are young age, low income and
educational attainment less than high school. Being single is significant and negative in
Model 2, indicating that unmarried or never married individuals trust police less, but single
is not significant in Model 1. The log pseudo-likelihood for the model is 4041.126.

[TABLE 3]

Two additional unexpected results were also uncovered. The first relates to placelevel aggregation of violent crime and trust in police. In the model, violent crime per capita
is not a significant predictor of trust in police. That is, an individual’s level of trust in police
is not influenced by an area’s violent crime rates. This finding challenges the crime control
and deterrence model of policing’s performance-based approach to garnering public trust,
which holds that police effectiveness at producing public safety related outcomes (e.g., low
crime rate, absence of conspicuous neglect) influences individual levels of trust in police.
What this result does not suggest is that police performance is irrelevant to considerations
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of public trust in police; indeed, an incompetent police force would also be unlikely to
enjoy a high level of trust from the public it serves (e.g., Sampson and Bartusch 1998).
Rather, this result resembles an important finding of the 1970s that fear of crime, rather
than actual crime rates, led individuals to abrogate their guardianship role of public spaces
(Greene 1987, 2000). The significance of that conclusion, which is echoed here, is that
crime rates do not have an impact on trust in police in the same way that crime rates do not
have an impact on fear of crime.
The second unexpected result from this model is the non-significance of the number
of police per capita and the percentage of the police force working as community policing
officers in predicting individual-level trust in police. The presence of police has an impact
on the social network effect such that more police makes the community trust the police
less but doesn’t have any additional effect on the individual’s decision to trust police. The
conspicuous presence of police officers in an area has been argued to have varying effects
on police trust. On one hand, the classical broken windows and crime control and
deterrence view is that additional police officers on foot patrol create a feeling of security
in neighborhood residents owing to the accessibility of officers and increased formal order
maintenance, reduced fear of crime and increased risk of apprehension (Moore,
Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988). Under this view, “seeing” police in an area produces a net
positive for that area, which hints at increased perceptions of the trustworthiness of police
and police institutions. On the other hand, proponents of labelling theory and critics of the
community policing philosophy argue that an increased police presence is a sign of an
area’s insecurity and delinquency, which could lead to increased fear of crime, shifts in
perceptions of public disorder and suspicion among residents, all of which could contribute
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to a reduction in the share of trust afforded to police officers (Greene and Taylor 1988;
Goffman 1978). The finding from this model will not settle the debate; it is enough to note
that in this model police per capita is significant for trust in police through the social
network effect.

Policy Discussion

In the context of police efforts to foster trust with members of the community, this
finding is important because it suggests that increased quality and quantity of police-public
contact, fair procedure or positive outcomes may not be sufficient to counteract the social
network effect. Individuals are embedded within social networks and share experiences
and narratives with other members, meaning that police efforts at building trust with
various communities cannot be a matter of simply change tactics: a critical share of the
community must be swayed into trusting police before individuals in low police trust areas
will change their behavior. At the same time, the results of this regression imply that trust
in police, once attained by a critical number of individuals within a community, is unlikely
to be easily lost as a result of individual police behavior.
One way of interpreting social network effects is through the concepts of tipping
points and collective memory. A tipping point is a “moment of critical mass” at which an
attitude or behavior within a group or within some proportion a group is widely adopted
by other members of that group (Gladwell 2000: 12; Grodzins 1957; Schelling 1971). The
presence of a social network effect implies multiple equilibria; that is, a process can have
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several outcomes, some of which are static and others of which are dynamic. The dynamic
equilibria are unstable and can be “tipped” toward one static modality or another if a critical
share of individuals adopt that modality. Research has demonstrated that tipping points
exist for wearing a style of clothing (e.g., Gladwell 2000), automobile ownership (e.g.,
Goetzke and Weinberger 2012) and racial segregation (Grodzins 1957; Schelling 1971).
The term collective memory is frequently used by sociologists to refer to “the
memory and representations of group pasts—whether these be ethnic, national, global, or
other collective historical events” (Teeger 2014: 71). Maurice Halbwachs, often credited
with founding the theory (Teeger 2014), was primarily interested in the intersection of
individuals as group members, space and the impressions they leave on one another, which
is similar to the concept of social network effects. Halbwachs writes: “[M]ost
groups…engrave their form in some way upon the soil and retrieve their collective
remembrances within the spatial framework thus defined” (1992: 14). Previous research
has demonstrated that incidents of police misconduct are shared through family, friend,
neighbor and other social group networks and can affect individual perceptions of trust in
police (see: Brunson 2007; Brunson and Miller 2006; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007;
King, Messner and Baller 2009). However, these studies were qualitative in nature and not
looking specifically for the presence of a social network effect for trust in police. Instead,
researchers were interested in understanding how African American youth understand and
evaluate police in their neighborhoods. Comments suggesting the presence of a social
network effect were elicited as a corollary to the main objective.
Bo Rothstein contends that collective memories are important because they
(collective memories) can explain individuals’ choice of strategy (i.e., trust/not trust) when
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encountering other individuals, groups and public institutions. He argues that the theory of
collective memory explains why some societies find themselves in a low trust social trap
(Rothstein 2005). A social trap is a situation in which two parties could be made better off
were they to cooperate with and trust one another, but neither party wants to be the first
mover and so no one benefits. The difficulty in getting out of the social trap is heightened
by the collective memory of past incivilities, real or perceived, which have endured and
been passed down through generations and which cannot rationally be forgotten. Rothstein
writes: “The problem of low interpersonal trust comes from discriminated groups having
been forced to live under public political institutions that have been, or which they have
believed to have been, deeply dysfunctional for them. The collective memory of things
such as gross police brutality, public lynchings, and systematic discrimination has a
tremendous effect on the belief systems of which the individuals in a group such as this
become the bearers” (Rothstein 2005: 127-128).
This scenario can lead to a static path dependency for trust in police. As a critical
share of an individual’s peer group do not trust police, the likelihood that the individual
will also not trust police increases. Continuing along the non-trusting path makes
subsequent steps along that path easier; however, the cost of returning to a previously
viable alternative, in this case trusting police, becomes more and more difficult, if not
impossible. Another way to think about what Rothstein is saying here is that memories of
past events form part of an individual’s mental map regarding which groups and institutions
in society can be trusted, which then influences in the present the decision to trust
individual members from these groups or institutions. The effect of collective memory
could be one reason why the violent crime per capita for 1968 variable was significant.
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Individually people do not think of violent crime in 1968 when deciding to trust police, but
collectively (e.g., through the social network effect) it has an impact. Thus, when it come
to the decision to trust police, history matters.
Rothstein’s idea that the collective memory of historical institutions could lead to
path dependent outcomes is lent support by a burgeoning literature on the impact of
historical institutions on contemporary behaviors and narratives (for an overview, see:
Nunn 2009). Scholars have investigated the effect of slavery on economic development
both in and out of Africa (Bertocchi 2016), the link between historically high
concentrations of slaves and persistent levels of inequality, weak institutions, violent and
property crime in Colombia (Buonanno and Vargas 2016) and Brazil (Fujiwara, Laudares
and Valencia C. 2019), persistent rates of regional entrepreneurship in Germany (Fritsch
and Wyrwich 2013), medieval persecution of Jews and anti-Semitic violence in Nazi
Germany (Voigtlander and Voth 2012), a “Hapsburg effect” for trust in government
(Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann 2011) and lynchings, anti-Civil Rights
Movement violence and contemporary voting behavior of African Americans (Peterson
and Ward 2015). Perhaps the best example of the consequence of historical institutions on
contemporary attitudes toward trust in police is given by Tankebe (2008; see also Tankebe
2009). He states that human rights violations, police corruption and police impunity are
salient characteristics of police service in Ghana and that these characteristics can be traced
to the operating philosophy of former colonial police. He writes that “[t]hese abuses have
alienated the police even more from many Ghanians, which leads to a significant distrust
in the official mission of the police— ‘service with integrity’” (Tankebe 2009: 1271).
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The challenge for police trust and legitimacy scholars is how to get out of a low
trust path dependent trap and convince a critical share of individuals within a reference
group to trust police and cooperate with them. Tyler’s procedural fairness perspective
offers some empirically-based guidance on this at the individual level (Tyler 1990, 2003,
2005; Sunshine and Tyler 2003); research has demonstrated if police deal with members
of the public in a fair and respectful manner that individuals’ perceptions of the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of police institutions should increase, but what this paper
has attempted to show is that peer group influence and collective memories are also factors
that need to be addressed before a perspective like procedural fairness can gain the kind of
broad-based trust and legitimacy police institutions desire. If collective memories lead to a
path dependent outcome of low trust in police, however, it may be the case that individual
trusting behavior may be difficult if not impossible to reverse. Thus, the stakes for police
are extremely high.
Fortunately, Rothstein has some suggestions for overcoming collective memory
and breaking out of a low trust social trap. His first suggestion is actually directed toward
battling corruption within institutions, but the theory could conceivably work in any
situation in which some form of institutional path dependency exists, be that police or
neighborhood institutions. Rothstein calls this the indirect big bang approach to fighting
corruption, and the basic premise is that trying to tackle corruption within an institution
incrementally and head on is likely to fail because there is a system underlying the
corruption that will resist direct efforts to tinker with different parts of the system to try
and eliminate that corruption (Rothstein 2011). In other words, Rothstein is saying that
small-scale, incremental changes will likely be counteracted by forces within an institution
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to maintain the status quo. What is needed is to “attack” corruption by getting the institution
off balance; that is, by addressing the corruption in large-scale, sweeping changes that do
not give institutional actors a chance to adjust their tactics. Rothstein’s indirect big bang
approach has clear parallels to addressing the influence of social network effects and
collective memories for trust in police. Rothstein says that collective memories cannot be
rationally forgotten; attempts at changing perceptions of police trustworthiness and
legitimacy incrementally provides too many opportunities for the larger social network
effect to adjust and return to the status quo (Rothstein 2005, 2011). An indirect big bang
approach to dealing with a social network effect for trust might, for example, work with
key neighborhood or community institutions on non-enforcement related matters that
challenge the narrative influence of collective memories in a large-scale and conspicuous
manner. In this way police can set the social network effect “off-balance” so that
individual-level efforts at trust building have a chance to succeed.
What kind of indirect big bang approach is needed to unbalance the influence of a
social network effect and collective memory? Following Rothstein, the answer is to take
as a guiding normative principle for the exercise of police authority the concept of
deontological impartiality (2011). Deontological (or universal) impartiality is central to
overcoming low trust social traps because it eschews partial, biased behavior on the part of
institutional actors, which has been one of the perennial concerns among minority and
vulnerable populations regarding police services (see: Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson
2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007). Adopting a normative value like universal
impartiality might serve to set both police institutions and the publics they serve offbalance such that changing attitudes and behaviors becomes possible.
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Conclusion

The findings reported here support the existence of a social network effect for trust
in police. The value of this paper is that it reveals previously unaddressed factors, social
network effects and collective memory, that influences trust in police, allowing for a more
nuanced understanding of the challenge of garnering perceptions of trust and legitimacy
for police. Contemporary approaches to changing perceptions of police trustworthiness do
not consider the influence of peer effects or path dependency, meaning that their policy
prescriptions may miss important opportunities for gaining the kind of broad-based
perceptions of trust and legitimacy those approaches strive for.
In considering the findings presented in this study, it is important to recognize some
limitations. The first limitation is that while the Social Capital Benchmark Survey remains
one of the richest sources of data in the United States measuring social capital, trust, quality
of life and other related concepts, an ideal dataset would be a longitudinal panel survey
designed specifically to assess the factors influencing individual-level trust in police. The
longitudinal panel design would allow the evaluation of changes in an individual’s trust
modalities over time, which makes possible the causal analysis of smaller-scale, individuallevel police tactics aimed at gaining more trust for police with larger-scale, aggregate-level
changes to police institutional behavior that may confound in cross-sectional analysis.
The second major limitation is that a quantitative research design such as that
presented in this paper cannot fully capture the role or impact of collective memories on
contemporary trust attitudes and behaviors. Much work on collective memory is qualitative
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in nature (see: Teeger 2014; Brunson 2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007) and relies
on in-depth interviews to probe not only the content of specific collective memories but
also how those memories are used to explain current societal conditions. Teeger (2014)
presents an excellent example of just this type of analysis. Teeger interviewed blacks and
white South African managers and professionals to explore how they selectively use South
Africa’s apartheid past as an explanans for contemporary crime problems. Research
findings indicate that blacks and whites invoke their apartheid past in differing ways to
explain crime: as both continuity and rupture. Understanding how and when individuated
collective memories of police malfeasance become salient is an important step toward
breaking out of a low trust social trap and gaining the kind of broad-based trust and
legitimacy currently sought by criminal justice practitioners and scholars.
In conclusion, the main argument of this paper has been that there is strong evidence
for the existence a social network effect for trust in police exists and that its existence has
important consequences for contemporary efforts to garner trust in police. The empirical
analysis supported this hypothesis. The policy implication of the social network effect is
that trust in police has a tipping point and can lead to path dependent outcomes which
require the adoption of a guiding norm like impartiality in order to unbalance. The
significance of this paper is that brings a deeper understanding of social network effects
into the criminal justice literature from other fields which have studied network effects in
the manner presented here in order to present a model of trust in police that deepens the
conceptual nuance to this most important issue of trust in police.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables.
Variable Definition

Min

Max

Mean

S.D.

Dependent Variable
Trust in police

0

1

0.808

0.394

Main Policy Variable
Social network effect for trust in police

0

1

0.803

0.099

Instruments
Violent crime per capita for 1968
Place-level median household income for 1999
(per thousand)
Controls
Male respondent
Black respondent
Hispanic respondent
Respondent residence: rent
Respondent age less than or equal to 30
Respondent income less than 30,000
Respondent unemployed
Respondent single and never married
Respondent education less than high school
Number of full-time sworn police per capita
Community police officers as percentage of total
police
Violent crime per capita for 2000
N = 6,347
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0
0.021 0.005 0.003
12.917 88.771 37.091 7.168

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.001
0.083

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.006
0.192

0.402
0.240
0.107
0.415
0.274
0.357
0.030
0.343
0.319
0.003
0

0.490
0.427
0.310
0.493
0.446
0.479
0.171
0.475
0.467
0.001
1

0.000

0.028

0.010

0.005

Table 4.2. Instrumental variable tests.
Tests of endogeneity (H0 = variables are
exogenous)
Durbin χ2
Wu-Hausman F
Wald χ2

Value

p

0.912
0.910
1.78

0.339
0.340
0.182

Overidentifcation (H0 = instruments are valid)
Sargan
Basmann

χ2
0.006
0.006

p
0.937
0.937

Weak Instruments (H0 = instruments are weak)
Montiel-Pflueger F-statistic

Critical Value
98.092

[TSLS, LIML]
[6.234, 13.560]

TSLS = Two-stage least squares; LIML = Limited information maximum likelihood
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Table 4.3: Two-stage least squares equation model for trust in police
Model (1)
Type of Variable Continuous
Method
OLS
Number of Observations
6,347
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared
--Police Trust Network Effect

---

Binary
ivprobit
6,347
--2.266***
(1.108)

-2.239**
--(0.950)
0.003***
Place-level Median Income (1999) Per Thousand
--(0.000)
-0.001
-0.137***
Male
(0.002)
(0.039)
-0.003
-0.752***
Black
(0.003)
(0.047)
-0.009** -0.452***
Hispanic
(0.004)
(0.064)
0.002
-0.046
Rent
(0.002)
(0.043)
0.001
-0.287***
Age Less Than or Equal to 30
(0.003)
(0.048)
0.001
-0.120***
Low Income
(0.002)
(0.044)
-0.006
-0.118
Unemployed
(0.007)
(0.105)
-0.008***
-0.063
Single
(0.002)
(0.046)
-0.003
-0.230***
Less Than High School Education
(0.003)
(0.044)
-47.692***
5.723
Police Officers Per Capita
(1.721)
(70.187)
-0.017*
-0.035
Percentage of Community Policing Officers
(0.009)
(0.100)
0.226
6.693
Violent Crime Per Capita (2000)
(0.458)
(5.217)
0.840***
-0.415
Constant
(0.010)
(1.094)
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Violent Crime Per Capita (1968)
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Table 4.4: Two-stage ordered probit equation model for trust in police
Model (2)
Type of Variable
Method
Number of Observations
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared

Continuous
OLS
6,347
0.417

Police Trust Network Effect

---

Ordered
oprobit
6,347
0.061
0.738**
(0.377)

-2.965**
--(1.349)
0.006***
Place-level Median Income (1999) Per Thousand
--(0.000)
-0.000
-0.107***
Male
(0.005)
(0.029)
-0.011*
-0.742***
Black
(0.006)
(0.036)
-0.013
-0.366***
Hispanic
(0.009)
(0.049)
0.003
-0.012
Rent
(0.006)
(0.032)
0.003
-0.246***
Age Less Than or Equal to 30
(0.006)
(0.036)
0.000
-0.040
Low Income
(0.006)
(0.033)
-0.011
-0.114
Unemployed
(0.014)
(0.082)
-0.018*** -0.103***
Single
(0.006)
(0.034)
-0.002
-0.111***
Less Than High School Education
(0.006)
(0.033)
-136.985*** -17.781
Police Officers Per Capita
(4.039)
(62.193)
-0.011
-0.029
Percentage of Community Policing Officers
(0.013)
(0.074)
-5.292***
5.467
Violent Crime Per Capita (2000)
(0.806)
(4.564)
2.379***
Constant
--(0.020)
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Violent Crime Per Capita (1968)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The overall findings of this dissertation are two. First, universal impartiality, in
addition to procedural fairness and police performance, is a significant predictor of trust in
police. That is, when people think about trusting police, considerations like police
performance and procedural fairness are important, but so too do people think about
impartiality. This is exactly Rothstein’s point about impartiality fits in with subjective
impressions of fairness. He argued that subjective perceptions of procedural fairness are
important to government’s ability to attain political legitimacy, but the norm by which
individuals will evaluate the “fairness” of the procedure is by the universal and impartial
nature of the implementation of that policy, not by some narrow concern with fairness as
it applies to the individual. It is also interesting that police performance remains a
significant predictor of trust in police. As discussed in the review of literature, the police
performance model was an implicit trust model in that the better police performed the more
likely people would trust them. The findings here support that claim.
The second finding is that a social network effect for trust in police exists and the
magnitude of its influence can be measured. The coefficient on the police trust network
variable was positive and significant, indicating the presence of a self-reinforcing social
network effect. That is, individuals are influenced in their decision to trust police by the
prevalence of that trust in that individual’s social reference groups. This finding adds
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broadens the criminal justice literature on the role of vicarious influences or social network
effects on trust in police. The criminal justice audience for this article conceptualize social
network effects as neighborhood effects which are essentially the uni-directional
contextual effects of some place-level attribute that varies with group characteristics.
Endogenous social network effects, on the other hand, are bi-directional social effects that
vary with the prevalence of an attitude or behavior in someone’s social reference group.
One way to conceptualize this difference between the two kinds of effects is that contextual
effects vary by group characteristic, so contextual effects will vary with socioeconomic
status, educational attainment, ethnicity, age, etc. This influence is only in one direction:
group characteristics influence individual behavior, but individual behavior does not
influence group characteristics (e.g., an individual attempting to increase his or her
educational attainment does not mean that educational attainment changes). Endogenous
social network effect varies with the prevalence of an attitude or behavior within a social
reference group. That group may be made up of individuals with various characteristics or
even who live in spatially discontinuous areas. These effects are bi-directional; that is, as
a behavior becomes prevalent amongst a critical share of that group, that group behavior
influences the individual’s behavior, but at the same time, the individual’s behavior
aggregates or makes up part of the group level behavior, indicating a reflection problem.
Together these findings suggest that generating trust in police requires more than
fair procedure. It involves exercising fair procedure within an impartial normative context
which underscores the sincerity and commitment of police to procedural fairness policies.
It also involves incorporating elements of the community policing philosophy in that the
presence of a social network effect on trust in police means that the procedural fairness
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approach needs to operate at the individual as well as the network level. Doing so may
require what Rothstein calls an indirect big bang approach that sets the collective narrative
of police mistrust “off-balance” long enough for progress in trust-building to be made.
The dissertation had several limitations. The first limitation comes in article two
with the need to use the European Social Survey Round 5. The European Social Survey is
a rich trove of data on a variety of topics, including measures of personal well-being,
politics, public attitudes toward climate change and justice. Despite this, the goal of this
particular essay was to say something about police and impartiality in the United States.
The United States has its own set of unique historical conditions which have led to current
levels of police trust, which is true of the European data also, but which make direct
comparisons based on the norms of institutions difficult. What can be said with some
degree of certitude is that, at least in the European context, across countries and historical
institutions, universal impartiality is a significant predictor of trust in police. Ideally, data
such as these would be available in the American context. It could be argued that the United
States and Western Europe would be somewhat comparable: both respond favorably to
universal impartiality. However, that argument is speculative.
The second limitation comes from the character of the data in both empirical
articles. Both the European Social Survey and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey are
cross-sectional in nature, which limits the scope for inferring causal relationships. In the
ideal scenario, police performance, procedural fairness, universal impartiality and social
capital data would be together in a longitudinal panel which would allow for better analysis
of the impacts of these concepts on perceptions over time. Concepts like universal
impartiality and social network effects are not likely to change in the short term because of
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a new, more partial political and policing regime. If a society has come to expect universal
impartiality from its public officials it will not throw that norm away even if the entire state
behaves partially toward groups in society. This is not the case, however, for procedural
fairness policing or police performance, especially in locations where universal
impartiality is perceived to be low. Similarly with social network effects, it is unlikely that
the influence of social network effects would abate in the short-term, but it may be the case
that the effect of social networks is not consistent over time and could be stronger at some
points relative to events in the community. Having data measured at regular intervals might
help disentangle whether there is a causative relationship between police performance,
procedural fairness and universal impartiality or whether past events – such as historical
corruption of institutions (collective memory) – leads to path dependent outcomes.
Another limitation is that people might have difficulty separating procedural
fairness from impartiality. Even though the ESS Round 5 data set provides access to an
array of individual perceptions regarding the police and the courts that is unsurpassed in
its richness, questions such as that for fair treatment (“In the cases they deal with, do police
treat victims in a fair and impartial manner?”) conflate the two concepts, making them
analytically difficult to parse out, and thus having an impact on the level of certainty that
can be carried by the conclusions presented here. One final limitation is that quantitative
research designs may not capture the role or the impact of collective memories on
contemporary trust attitudes and behaviors. Most collective memory work tends to be
qualitative and relies on in-depth interviews to probe the content but also how these
memories are used politically. It is important not only to understand what people’s
perceptions of the police are but also to probe deeper into when and how these perceptions
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articulate. So in addition to being able to understand how memory of the police is important
to people, it should also be possible to measure how impactful those memories are viz a
viz individual-level trust in police.
The extensions which future research should examine follow from the limitations
of the present study. The first extension is that it is critical for the study of police, not only
in terms of trust but also in terms of the information available about police departments, to
have a deploy a standardized law enforcement survey taken at regular and routine intervals
that includes some measures of public attitudes and behaviors towards police. The Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) series provides some
portion of this data already, but it has two serious limitations. First, LEMAS is conducted
every three to five years instead of every year, which is an issue because departmental
priorities and funding can vary over time, and this leads to changes in the police services
offered. With data collected every three to five years it is difficult to detect how these
changes were brought about: perhaps there was a police surge followed by a gradual draw
down of officers or perhaps a community policing unit was found to be compromised,
leading to its dissolution. Knowing more about the department from year to year can aid
greatly in utilizing police data with other data sets. The second issue is that LEMAS surveys
change each time they are deployed making comparison longitudinal panel analysis
impossible on all but the most general characteristics of departments. Having these surveys
standardized will improve the type of analyses that can be conducted with this data.
Another extension is the need for an update to existing social capital and trust data
in the United States. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS) 2000 and 2006 remain
some of the richest data sources for researcher looking to study these topics but they are at
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the time of writing over thirteen years old. Further, only the SCBS is geocoded so it is not
even possible to look at how levels of social capital or trust change over time (also means
they can’t be used as a panel). This is a problem for researchers looking to measure the
effects of new police strategies and tactics on perceptions of police in the population
served, such as is the case with procedural fairness, police performance and impartiality. It
is likely the case that smaller, department specific databases exist that contain some of this
data, but the lack of general availability of these databases and their lack of standardization
means that they are not widely comparable which makes comparison over time studies
difficult. A survey like the European Social Survey, which was used for one of the
empirical articles in the present study, which is conducted every 2 years, and which adds
new modules over time would be ideal in the American context, particularly if that data
was geocoded.
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